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Nonbelievers and Government Speech
Caroline Mala Corbin*
ABSTRACT: In the past few years, nonbelievers have become much more
prominent in the United States. But while their visibility has increased, they
are still a small minority, and they remain disliked, distrusted, and not
truly American in the eyes of many. As a result, many nonbelievers are
hesitant about disclosing their views, and those who do often face hostility
and discrimination.
This Article argues that government religious speech such as "In God We
Trust" or a Latin cross war memorial violates the Establishment Clause in
part because it exacerbates the precarious position of nonbelievers in this
country. One of the main goals of the Establishment Clause is to protect
religious minorities like nonbelievers. Contrary to claims that government
religious speech is essentially harmless and that any offense it causes should
not be considered of constitutional dimension, government religious speech
harms both the equality and liberty of nonbelievers. It undermines the
equality of nonbelievers by sending the message that they are not worthy of
equal regard and by reinforcing stereotypes-in particular, that atheists are
immoral and unpatriotic-which leads to discrimination against them. The
perpetuation of these stereotypes also undermines the liberty of nonbelievers
by making them less willing, or even afraid, to follow the dictates of their
conscience. In short, the claim that government religious speech does not
violate the Establishment Clause because it only offends nonbelievers
misunderstands exactly what is at stake.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Don't Believe in God? You Are Not Alone." This was only one of
dozens of atheist slogans on buses, trains, and billboards this past year.'
Atheism's visibility in the United States is on the rise. Books by atheists
whose goal is to debunk religion have become bestsellers.- Organizations for
nonbelievers are growing by leaps and bounds. Recent surveys show that the
number of Americans who identify themselves as not belonging to any
religion has doubled in the past twenty years.3 President Obama even
acknowledged nonbelievers in his inaugural address.4
At the same time, nonbelievers still make up a small minority in the
United States, and they remain disliked, distrusted, and not truly American
in the eyes of many. As a result, many atheists are hesitant to reveal their
religious views, and those who do risk discrimination and attack. After all,
the United States continues to be a deeply religious nation, and much of
American culture is steeped in religion, from our pledge declaring that we
are one nation "under God," to our national motto proclaiming "In God We
Trust," to our war memorials in the form of Latin crosses.5
Where does the Establishment Clause, which reads "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion,"6 fit into this picture?
On the most general level, the Establishment Clause has been interpreted to
bar the state from favoring one or some religions over others and from
favoring religion over nonreligion. But what does this mean for
nonbelievers? What protection in particular should the Establishment
Clause provide for them?
The Establishment Clause was adopted to prevent several problematic
consequences that often followed state establishment of religion. First,
because civil strife, and even religious wars, tend to ensue whenever the state
favors one religion over others, the Establishment Clause protects the
stability of the civil society.7 Second, the Establishment Clause protects the
established religion from the corruption and degradation that so often
accompany alliance or involvement with the state.8  Finally, the
Establishment Clause protects those who do not share the established
religion's beliefs, as persecution or discrimination may, and historically
usually did, follow when the state prefers one religion over others.9
1. See infra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 27-33.
4. See infra note 51.
5. See Salazar v. Buono, 13o S. Ct. 1803 (2010); Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F. 3 d
1O99 (9 th Cir. 201 1).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
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This Article focuses on the last goal-protecting those who do not
belong to the favored religion. It does not argue that this is the
Establishment Clause's most important goal, though it is the one most in
keeping with the countermajoritarian spirit of the Bill of Rights. Rather, it
provides theoretical justifications for why and how the Establishment Clause
protects religious minorities and, in particular, nonbelievers. Nonbelievers
include all those who do not profess belief in a religion. Thus, the term
encompasses those who describe themselves as atheist, humanist, secular, or
ethical culture.l°
Although few would deny that that the Establishment Clause protects
those without religious beliefs, there is great disagreement about the scope
of that protection. This Article argues that the Establishment Clause should
be understood as protecting both the equality and religious liberty of
nonbelievers. While some argue that the goal of the religion clauses is first
and foremost to protect religious liberty" and others maintain that the
Establishment Clause is primarily meant to protect the political equality of
those outside the religious mainstream," this Article assumes that both
religious liberty and equality are major concerns of the Establishment
Clause.
In particular, the Article focuses on the harm to nonbelievers caused by
government religious speech-an issue not yet addressed in the literature.'s
Many courts and commentators have argued that the national motto and
Pledge or governmentally displayed Ten Commandments and Latin crosses
are essentially harmless, and that any offense they cause should not be
considered of constitutional dimension.'4 This Article argues that
lo. See infra Part II.A. i (defining these terms). Not included are those who do not believe
in God but still subscribe to nonmonotheistic religious beliefs. Nonbelievers are atheists in that
they do not believe in God. Yet for various reasons, many prefer not to use the term to describe
themselves. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, both terms are used
interchangeably in this Article.
s I. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the
Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673, 677 (1 98o) ("[A] central purpose of the Establishment Clause
(as well as of the Free Exercise Clause) was to protect religious liberty ... ."); Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 ("[R]eligious liberty is the central
value and animating purpose of the Religion Clauses .. ").
12 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
THE CONSTITUTION (2007); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF
AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (20o8); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central
Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975).
13. Atheists are mostly absent in the legal scholarship and underexamined in other fields
as well. See Will Martin Gervais, Do You Believe in Atheists? Trust and Anti-Atheist Prejudice i
(Aug. 2oo8) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of British Columbia), available at https://
circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/1 5 4 9/ubc_2oo8_fallgervais -will.pdfjsessionid=FDoE9oD
CoE2 3 B2BA22C 3 7 8B 3 DD3 23 iA6?sequence=i ("Despite the attention that atheism is receiving
in culture at large, the scientific literature on the topic is scant at best.").
14. See inftanotes 273-75 and accompanying text.
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government religious speech of this sort does in fact harm nonbelievers.'s
Atheists-for nonbelievers are atheists-occupy a unique position in our
society, and government religious speech affects them in a manner that is
distinct from other religious minorities. For example, many Americans
believe that, unlike believers of any stripe, atheists are immoral and
unpatriotic.' 6 Government religious speech perpetuates these stereotypes,
thereby undermining the equality and liberty of nonbelievers. 17
Part II traces the rise of nonbelievers in the United States and notes that
though the visibility and, perhaps, numbers of nonbelievers in the United
States have been increasing, distrust of and discrimination against them
remains strong. Part II also examines the Establishment Clause's
longstanding protection of religious nonbelievers and argues that protection
of religious minorities such as atheists should be one of the Establishment
Clause's main purposes.
Part III argues that one way the Establishment Clause protects
nonbelievers is essentially to serve as an Equal Protection Clause for
religious minorities. As many scholars have noted, the Equal Protection
Clause has an expressive component; so too does the Establishment Clause.
Indeed, the Establishment Clause's endorsement test attempts to capture
the insight from Brown v. Board of Education that government action can send
unacceptable messages of inequality. While these messages are wrong in and
of themselves, they cause tangible harms as well, including the perpetuation
of stereotypes that lead to discrimination and exclusion from the social and
political community.
Part IV examines the liberty component of the Establishment Clause,
arguing that the Establishment Clause should also be understood as
protecting the freedom of religious conscience. By putting its power and
prestige behind religion, the government not only pressures nonbelievers
into conforming to mainstream religious beliefs but also reinforces existing
prejudice against nonbelievers, which can keep nonbelievers in the closet
and hinder them from acting in accordance with their beliefs.
15. In this Article, "government religious speech" refers to government speech that
amounts to a religious practice or endorsement of religion, rather than government speech that
merely discusses religion.
16. See infra Part II.A.4 .
17. See infra Part III.B. 3 (describing how government religious speech reinforces
stereotypes of atheists as immoral and unpatriotic).
2012]
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II. NONBELIEVERS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. THE RISE OFNONBELEVERS
1. Different Types of Nonbelievers
When Americans are asked what religion they belong to, many name a
specific one, such as Catholicism, Judaism, Islam, or Hinduism. But others
answer that they are secular, or have no religion, or are humanists, agnostics,
or atheists. An agnostic is someone "who holds the view that any ultimate
reality (as God) is unknown and probably unknowable."18 An atheist, on the
other hand, does not believe in God.'9 There are at least two types of
atheists. There are "hard" atheists, who affirmatively deny the existence of
God and will assert as much.2o This is usually the popular understanding of
atheism.21 There are also "soft" atheists, who are simply without a belief in
God.22 The category of nonbelievers might also include agnostics or atheists
who describe themselves as humanist,23 secular, or Ethical Culture.24 These
nonbelievers may eschew the term agnostic or atheist as a description
because it is one that centers around the concept of God and their focus is
not on the existence or nonexistence of God or gods. They may also avoid
those terms because of the stigma associated with them.25
18. Agnostic Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
agnostic (last visited Oct. 3o, 201 1). In other words, an agnostic is someone "who is not
committed to believing in either the existence or the nonexistence of God or a god." Id.
19. Merriam-Webster defines atheist as "one who believes that there is no deity." Atheist
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/atheist (last visited
Oct. 30, 201 1).




23. Humanism is defined as a philosophy "centering on humans and their values,
capacities, and worth and deemphasizing religious beliefs." AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY 675 (4 th ed. 2002).
24. The American Ethical Union, whose motto is "deed before creed," defines Ethical
Culture as a humanistic "movement inspired by the ideal that the supreme aim of human life is
working to create a more humane society." AM. ETHICAL UNION, http://aeu.org/ (last visited
Oct. 30, 201 1).
25. See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing Americans' unfavorable view of atheists); see also Babak
Alidoosti, The Process and Experience of Deciding To Live Openly Atheist in a Christian
Family: A Qualitative Study i (Dec. 11, 2009) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Virginia Polytechnic
Institute and State University), available at http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/thesis/available/etd-
12222009-14 024 7/unrestricted/AlidoostiBT_2oo9.pdf (suggesting that atheists in America
may avoid the label for fear of discrimination).
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2. Growth of Nonbelievers
The number of nonbelievers in the United States may well be
increasing.26 According to the American Religious Identification Survey
("ARIS") 2008, the number of Americans who describe themselves as having
no religious affiliation has almost doubled in less than twenty years.27 In
199o, 8.2% of Americans stated they had no religious affiliation; by 2oo8,
that number had increased to 15.o%.28 Another large-scale religious survey
found similar results, with 16.1% of American adults responding that they
are not currently affiliated with any particular religion.29 Not all of these
"nones," as they have been dubbed, are atheists.so ARIS found that 2.3% of
all Americans are atheist and another io% are agnostic.3' Nevertheless,
these "nones" are growing in all fifty states,32 and their percentages are even
higher among young Americans.33
26. The percentage of atheists in other countries is much higher. In one study, 41% of
Norwegians, 48% of the French, and 54% of Czechs said they did not believe in God, although
the same study found that only io%, 19%, and 20%, respectively, self-identified as atheist. Phil
Zuckerman, Atheism: Contemporary Numbers and Patterns, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
ATHEISM, supra note 2o, at 47, 47, 49-51.
27. BARRY A. KOSMIN & ARIELA KEYSAR, AMERICAN RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION SURVEY
[ARIS 2oo8] SUMMARY REPORT 3 & tbl.3 (2009), available at http://commons.trincoll.edu/aris/
files/20 1 /o8/ARISReport_2oo8.pdf (surveying a nationally representative sample of 54,461
adults).
28. Id. The unaffiliated includes those Americans who answered "none," "atheist"
"agnostic," "secular," or "humanistic," id. app. A at 23, when asked, "What is your religion, if
any?," id. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also BARRY A. KOSMIN ET AL., AMERICAN
NONES: THE PROFILE OF THE NO RELIGION POPULATION, at i (2009), available at http://
commons.trincoll.edu/aris/files/20 t1 /o8/NONESo8.pdf.
29. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY 5 (2OO8)
[hereinafter PEW SURVEY], available at http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report-religious-
landscape-study-full.pdf (summarizing findings based on interviews with more than 35,000
adult Americans).
30. Id. (reporting the breakdown of subgroups within "Major Religious Traditions").
Similarly, not all of the "unaffiliateds" are atheists. Instead, out of the 16. 1 %, 1.6% self-identify
as atheist, 2.4% self-identify as agnostic, and 6.3% have a secular orientation. Id. at 6. Thus, in
the ARIS survey, "based on their stated belief rather than their religious identification," 12%
are atheist or agnostic, KOSMIN & KEYSAR, supra note 27, at Highlights, while in the Pew survey,
10.3% are atheist, agnostic, or secular, PEW SURVEY, supra note 29, at 6.
31. KOSMIN & KEYSAR, supra note 27, at 8 & tbl. 4 (describing people's various beliefs with
respect to the existence of God). Plus, another 12% are Deists who believe "[t] here is a higher
power but no personal God." Id. Thus, close to a quarter of Americans do not believe in a
personal God.
32. Id. at 17.
33. According to an ARIS survey, while 15% of the total U.S. population falls into the
"None" category, 22% of the adults aged 18-29 do. KOSMIN ETAL., supranote 28, at 17 fig. 2.1.
According to the Pew survey, 25% of adults 18-29 are not affiliated with a religion, with i6%




The visibility of atheists has definitely increased over the last five or six
years. Starting with Sam Harris's The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the
Future of Reason34 and continuing with Richard Dawkins's The God Delusion35
and Christopher Hitchens's God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything,36
a string of books by New Atheists37 have become bestsellers.38 While these
pioneers of New Atheism wrote polemics savaging religion as false,
ridiculous, and deeply harmful, a second wave of New Atheist books, such as
Good Without God: What a Billion Nonreligious People Do Believe by Greg
Epstein39 and Living Without God by Ronald Aronson,4o focus less on
attacking religion and more on examining a life without God. These books
have also become bestsellers.4' Meanwhile, an atheist iPhone application
found its way to the top ten book-apps list on iTunes.4'
Atheist organizations have also proliferated in the past ten years. In
2003, there were forty-two atheist student groups on college campuses.43 By
2010, the number had increased fivefold.44 The growth is not limited to
college campuses. According to one tally, six times more atheist groups exist
34. SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE OF REASON
(2004).
35. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION (2006).
36. CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT: How RELIGION POISONS EVERYTHING
(2007).
37. Other books by leaders of the New Atheism movement include: SAM HARRIS, LETTER
TO A CHRISTIAN NATION (2oo6); VICTOR J. STENGER, GOD: THE FAILED HYPOTHESIS: How
SCIENCE SHOWS THAT GOD DOES NOT EXIST (2007); VICTORJ. STENGER, THE NEW ATHEISM:
TAKING A STAND FOR SCIENCE AND REASON (2009).
38. "'The End of Faith' won the 2005 PEN/Martha Albrand Award for First Nonfiction
and sold more than 270,000 copies. .." David Segal, Atheist Evangelist, WASH. POST
(Oct. 26, 2oo6), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2oo6/o/25/
AR2oo61o2 5 o1 9 9 8.html; see alsoJacqueline L. Salmon, In America, Nonbelievers Find Strength in
Numbers, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/0 9 /1 4 /AR0070 91 402199.html ("In the past two years, five books touting
atheism have hit the bestseller lists ....").
39. GREG M. EPSTEIN, GOOD WITHOUT GOD: WHAT A BILLION NONRELIGIOUS PEOPLE DO
BELIEVE (2009).
40. RONALD ARONSON, LIVING WITHOUT GOD (2oo8).
41. See Best Sellers: Hardcover Nonfiction, N.Y. TIMES Uan. 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.
com/20 10/o / o/17/books/bestseller/besthardnonficton.html (ranking Epstein's Good Without
God at number thirty-one).
42. Press Release, Jay-Roc Invs., Inc., The Atheist Pocket Debater iPhone App Remains on
Top Ten Best Selling Apps List in Book Category on iTunes (July 16, 201o0), available at http://
www.prweb.com/releases/iPhoneapp/atheist-book-app/prweb395 4 13 4.htm.
43. According to the Student Secular Alliance, there were 42 secular student groups in
2003 and 195 in late 2009. Nara Schoenberg, Young and Atheist, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. I I, 2oo),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/20 10-04-11 /features/ct-sun-atheists-20 100407. _atheist-
god-delusion-secular-student-alliance.
44. By 2010, the number had grown to 225. Susan Kim, Atheist Student Groups on Rise
Nationally, DAILY ORANGE (Nov. 2, 201o), http://www.dailyorange.com/news/atheist-student-
groups-on-rise-nationally-s. 1739857.
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now than in 2005.45 Parenting groups for nonbelievers have exploded from
one or two in 2005 to at least thirty-three in 2009.46 These groups have not
been confined to large cities; on the contrary, they have sprung up across
the country, including the Bible Belt.47 The first lobbying group for
nonbelievers, the Secular Coalition for America, was formed in 2o0248 and
met with White House officials in 2010.49 The first African Americans for
Humanism Conference was held in 2010.50 President Obama's
acknowledgment in his inaugural address that "[w]e are a nation of
Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus and nonbelievers"5' confirms the
growing significance of American nonbelievers.
One of the more public faces of the growing atheist movement has
been its recent advertising campaigns. The Freedom From Religion
Foundation has installed over fifty billboards in thirty states in the past four
years,52 ranging from "Imagine No Religion," to its Christmastime 'Yes,
Virginia... there is no God."53 The less confrontational United Coalition of
Reason has also been actively campaigning since its 2009 incorporation,
proclaiming on buses and billboards in twenty-six cities, "Don't believe in
45. One estimate found 59 atheist groups in 2005 compared to 372 in 2oo9. G. Jeffrey
MacDonald, Ranks of Atheists Grow, Get Organized, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 16, 2oo9),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2009/o716/p2 2so s-ussc.html (citing statistics from
American Atheists, a networking and advocacy organization).
46. Id.
47. Radio Interview by Michel Martin with Blair Scott, Founder, N. Ala. Free Thought
Ass'n (Aug. 14, 2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=
111885128.
48. History, SECULAR COAL. FOR AM., http://www.secular.org/history (last visited Nov. 1,
201 1). According to its website, the ten-member "Secular Coalition for America is a 501 (c)4
advocacy organization whose purpose is to amplify the diverse and growing voice of the
nontheistic community in the United States." About the Secular Coalition for America, SECULAR
COAL. FORAM., http://www.secular.org/about/main (last visited Nov. 1, 201 1).
49. Margaret Talev, Obama Aides To Meet with Atheists at White House, DESERET NEWS
(Feb. 27, 20 lO), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/7000 12 4 7 3 /Obama-aides-to-meet-with-
atheists-at-White-House.html.
50. Chika Oduah & Lauren E. Bohn, Blacks, Mirroring Larger U.S. Trend, 'Come Out' as
Nonbelievers, HUFFINGTON POST (May 24, 201o), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/201o/o5/
24 /blacks-mirroring-larger-u-n_587854.html.
51. Barack H. Obama, President of the U.S., Inaugural Address, 3 (Jan. 20, 2009),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-200900001/pdf/DCPD-200ooooo.pdf.
President Obama said: "For we know that our patchwork heritage is a strength, not a weakness.
We are a nation of Christians and Muslims, Jews and Hindus and nonbelievers. We are shaped
by every language and culture, drawn from every end of this Earth." Id. President Obama's
address was the first time a President publicly acknowledged nonbelievers.
52. Bus Sign/Billboard Campaign, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND., http://www.ffrf.org/
get-involved/bus-billboard-campaign (last visited Oct. 30, 201 1).
53. Billboards in Action!, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND., http://www.ffrf.org/get-
involved/bus-billboard-campaign/billboards-in-action/ (last visited Sept. 22, 201 1).
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God? You are not alone"54 and "Are you good without God? Millions are."55
A variety of other groups have sponsored signs that run the gamut from
"You don't have to believe in God to be a moral or ethical person"56 to "In
the Beginning, Man Created God."57
These campaigns have not been welcomed with open arms. Billboard
and bus advertisements in Massachusetts,s
58 North Carolina,59 Idaho,
6o
Colorado,6' Michigan 62 and California have been vandalized.
63 A "Don't
believe in God? You are not alone" billboard was removed in Cincinnati
after the landowner, who leased the land on which the billboard stood,
received multiple death threats.64 Transit authorities in Des Moines pulled
"Don't believe in God? You are not alone" advertisements from public buses
after people complained. 65 Bloomington Transit rejected as too
controversial "You can be good without God" advertisements, despite having
54. About Us, UNITED COAL. OF REASON, http://unitedcor.org/national/page/about-us
(last updated Dec. 8, 2010).
55. Godless Ads Now on Fayetteville Buses, UNITED COAL. OF REASON (Apr. 13, 201 o), http://
unitedcor.org/national/news/godless-ads-now-fayetteville-buses.
56. Clyde Haberman, Their Belief Is in the Power of Persuasion, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/200 9 /07/2 4 /nyregion/24nyc.html (internal quotation marks
omitted).
57. Manya A. Brachear, Atheist Group Brings Mobile Message to CTA, CHI. TRiB. (May
24, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-o5-24/news/09052 20468- 1 -advertising-
crusade-religion-god (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Jacqueline Lavache, Boston Coalition of Reason Poster Is Vandalized, EXAMINER.COM (Nov.
12, 2009) (on file with author) (reproducing vandalized "Good without God? 40 Million
Americans are" poster altered to "Are you Good with God? Over 40 Million Americans are in
Need of Salvation!").
59. Tim Funk, Atheist Group's Billboard Vandalized, CHARLOTE OBSERVER (June 29, 2010),
available at http://pluralism.org/news/view/2453
8 (reporting that vandals spray painted
"Under God" onto billboard reading "One Nation Indivisible" in Charlotte, N.C.).
6o. Death Threats Force Removal of Atheist Billboard, CURRENT (Nov. 13, 2009), http://
current.com/community/91446 4 5 3 -death.threats-force-removal-of-atheist-billboard.htm (noting
vandalism to billboards in Idaho); Duke Helfand, Humanists Launch a Godless Holiday Campaign,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2009), http://articles.latimes.cOm/2oo9/dec/07/local/la-me-beliefs7-
2oo9dec07 (noting that vandals painted over "out" in a "Millions are good without God"
billboard in Idaho).
61. Death Threats Force Removal of Atheist Billboard, supra note 6o (noting vandalism to
billboards in Colorado).
62. Niraj Warikoo, Atheist Bus Ads Are Desecrated, DETROIT FREE PRESS, March 16, 201o, at
A4 (noting that "Don't" was torn off or scratched off in "Don't believe in God? You are not
alone" bus advertisements in Detroit).
63. Id.
64. Death Threats Force Removal of Atheist Billboard, supra note 6o (internal quotation marks
omitted).
65. Cynthia Reynaud &Jason Clayworth, ACLU Questions Removal of Atheists' Bus Ads, DES
MOINES REG., Aug. 7, 2oo9, at iB (noting that some people had refused to ride buses with the
ad on them). The ads were reinstated after the ACLU of Iowa got involved. Cynthia Reynaud,
Atheist Ads Will Go Back on Buses, DART Decides, DES MOINES REG., Aug. 8, 2oo9, at ilB.
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accepted advertisements from religious organizations in the past.
66
Discomfort with those who do not believe in God is hardly a new
development, as discrimination against atheists is longstanding and deeply
rooted.
3. Discrimination Against Nonbelievers
Discrimination against atheists was officially sanctioned in the United
States well into the twentieth century. 67 In many states, atheists were not
allowed to serve in public office, on a jury, or as a witness in court-even
long after these same disadvantages were lifted for other historically
subordinated groups. 68 Atheists lost jobs and custody of their children
because of their beliefs.69 Finally, atheists were social pariahs, unwelcome in
private clubs and associations, and the victims of harassment and violence.7o
Despite the Religious Test Clause in the U.S. Constitution, which reads
"no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or
public Trust under the United States,"7 many states barred atheists from
holding office. For example, Maryland's constitutional provision, providing
that "no religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any
office of profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the
existence of God,"72 was not invalidated until the 1961 Supreme Court case
of Torcaso v. Watkins.73 Still today, several state constitutions exclude those
66. Reynaud & Clayworth, supra note 65. The ACLU sued, and the agency eventually
settled and agreed to run the ads. Id.; see Brady Gillihan, Atheist Group Wins Battle To Place Ads on
City Buses, BLOOMINGTON HERALD-TIMES, July 28, 2o9, http://www.heraldtimesonline.com/
stories/2009/07/28/news.qp-862o 69.sto.
67. Eugene R. Milhizer, So Help Me Allah: An Historical and Prudential Analysis of Oaths as
Applied to the Current Controversy of the Bible and Quran in Oath Practices in America, 70 OHIO ST. L.J.
1, 26 n. it0 (2009) (stating the sentiment that atheists should not be allowed as witnesses "was
not put to rest in America until well into the twentieth century").
68. Paul W. Kaufman, Note, Disbelieving Nonbelievers: Atheism, Competence, and Credibility in
the Turn of the Centuy American Courtroom, 15 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 395, 397 (2003).
69. See infra notes 89-103, 317 and accompanying text.
70. See infra Part III.B.
71. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. Although there was room for debate that the Religious Test
Clause applied only to federal office, see, e.g., Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and
the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 674,
714 (1987), the point was essentially mooted after the Supreme Court decided Torcaso v.
Watkins. See infra note 73.
72. MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights, art. 37; see also MD. CONST. Declaration of Rights,
art. 36 ("[N]or shall any person, otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a witness, or
juror, on account of his religious belief; provided, he believes in the existence of God .... .").
73. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (holding that Maryland could not
require Torcaso to declare his belief in God in order to assume his commission as notary public
because the "Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the appellant's
freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him").
2012]
IOWA LAW REVIEW
who do not believe in God from state positions.74 Even after Torcaso held
that these provisions are unenforceable, South Carolina cited its provision-
"No person who denies the existence of the Supreme Being shall hold any
office under this Constitution"75-against an atheist seeking to become a
notary public in 1992.76 It wasn't until 1997 that the South Carolina
Supreme Court finally declared the provision unconstitutional.7 Meanwhile,
when enacting its new state constitution in 197 o , North Carolina retained
the provision disqualifying from office "all persons who shall deny the being
of Almighty God."78 Similarly, when in 2oo9 a state representative proposed
an amendment to repeal the anti-atheist provision in Arkansas's
constitution,79 it died in committee. 8o
Atheists were also disqualified from serving as witnesses in court
because they could not swear to God that their testimony was true.8' While
believers could be counted on to give truthful testimony under threat of
74. ARK. CONST. art. ig, § i ("No person who denies the being of a God shall hold any
office in the civil departments of this State, nor be competent to testify as a witness in any
Court."); MISS. CONST. art. 14, § 265 ("No person who denies the existence of a Supreme Being
shall hold any office in this State."); N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 8 ("The following persons shall be
disqualified for office: First, any person who shall deny the being of Almighty God."); PA.
CONST. art. I, § 4 ("No person who acknowledges the being of a God and a future state of
rewards and punishments shall, on account of his religious sentiments, be disqualified to hold
any office or place of trust or profit under this Commonwealth."); S.C. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("No
person who denies the existence of the Supreme Being shall hold any office under this
Constitution."); TENN. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ("No person who denies the being of God, or a future
state of rewards and punishments, shall hold any office in the civil department of this State.");
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office,
or public trust, in this State; nor shall any one be excluded from holding office on account of
his religious sentiments, provided he acknowledge the existence of a Supreme Being.").
75. S.C. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
76. In his application to become a notary public, atheist Herb Silverman crossed off the
"So help me God" part of the oath. His application was rejected. Silverman v. Campbell, 486
S.E.2d 1, 1 (S.C. 1997).
77. Id. at 2 (holding that the provision violated the First Amendment and the Religion
Test Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
78. Gary R. Govert, Essay, Something There Is That Doesn't Love a Wal: Reflections on the History
of North Carolina's Religious Test for Public Office, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1o86-87 (1986) (quoting
N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 5) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. David Waters, Atheist Revival in Arkansas, WASH. POST UNDER GOD BLOG (Feb.
13, 2009, 1:53 PM), http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/undergod/2009/02/an
advocate for atheists in-ar.html; see also H.R.J. Res. 1oo9, 8 7 th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark.
2009).
8o. ARK. H.R. JouRNAL, 87 th Gen. Assemb. 5848, 585
o, available at http://www.
arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2oog/R/House%2oJournal/ADDENDUM% 2o87TH%2oGENERAL
%2oASSEMBLY.pdf.
81. Kaufman, supra note 68, at 416-18 & nn.129-42 (stating that among the states that
excluded atheists as witnesses were Arkansas, Maryland (in its constitution), Alabama, North
Carolina, Delaware, New Hampshire, NewJersey, and South Carolina (by common law)).
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eternal damnation, no such fear compelled nonbelievers. 82 This bar
persisted until the latter half of the twentieth century.83 For example,
Maryland's highest court, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, held in i96o
that "it seems clear that under our Constitution disbelief in a Supreme
Being, and the denial of any moral accountability for conduct, not only
renders a person incompetent to hold public office but to give testimony, or
serve as a juror."84 The court concluded, "The historical record makes it
clear that religious toleration, in which this State has taken pride, was never
thought to encompass the ungodly."s5 In the states that did permit atheists
to testify, many allowed their testimony to be impeached because of their
beliefs.8 6 As late as 1963, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that while it
was not "essential" for a witness to believe in a Supreme Being, it was
"desirable," and that a lack of faith is "merely a matter to be considered in
passing upon his credibility."8 7
Historically, at common law, parents could lose custody of their
children for professing disbelief in God. In England, the famous poet Percy
Bysshe Shelley was not only expelled from Oxford88 but also lost custody of
his children on account of his "immoral and vicious" atheism.89 In fact, his
case marked one of the first times that a father lost a custody dispute in
England.9o As summarized in Story's Commentaries, atheism rendered
parents unfit to rear their children:
82. Id. at 403 (disqualifying atheists on the theory that "since they did not fear the
retribution of any god at all, they could not be trusted to tell the truth"); see also Milhizer, supra
note 67, at 4 ("[T]he oath acts as a guarantor of truth; it guards against testimony that is either
false or wavers from the truth by juxtaposing the individual's dishonest motive against his sense
of moral culpability and fear of divine punishment."); id. at 29 n. 118 (referencing John Locke,
who declared that "[piromises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society,
can have no hold upon an atheist." (quoting A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 32 (William
Popple trans., 2004) (1689))).
83. Kaufman, supra note 68, at 407 (noting that a minority of states-approximately
nineteen of the forty-eight that joined the Union by 195o-"neither rendered atheists
incompetent nor allowed questioning to affect their credibility").
84. Torcaso v. Watkins, 162 A.2d 438,443 (Md. 196o), rev'd, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
85. Id.
86. Kaufman, supra note 68, at 412.
87. Jones v. State, 132 S.E.2d 648, 649 (Ga. 1963). The Federal Rules of Evidence put an
end to these practices in federal court after they were formally adopted in 1975. Milhizer, supra
note 67, at 32-33; see also FED. R. EVID. 6oi ("Every person is competent to be a witness except
as otherwise provided in these rules."); FED. R. EVID. 61o ("Evidence of the beliefs or opinions
of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of
their nature the witness' credibility is impaired or enhanced.").
88. He was sent down from Oxford after the publication of his Necessity of Atheism. RICHARD
HOLMES, SHELLEY: THE PURSUIT 54-55 (1974).
89. Shelleyv. Westbrooke, (1817) 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch.) 851.
9
o . Montgomery Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders, 381 A.2d 1154, 1 16o n.8 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1977) ("It was not until the Victorian era that a father lost a custody dispute in
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Although, in general, parents are intrusted with the custody... of
their children .... whenever (for example) it is found, that a father
is guilty of gross ill treatment or cruelty towards his infant children;
or that he is in constant habits of drunkenness and blasphemy, or
low and gross debauchery; or that he professes atheistical or
irreligious principles; ... in every such case the Court of Chancery
will interfere and deprive him of the custody of his children .... 9,
The tradition of denying atheist parents custody continued into the
twentieth century in the United States. In one case from the 193os, a New
Jersey woman lost custody of her two children because of her "atheistic and
communistic beliefs."92 The court stated that the woman was free to believe
what she wished, but that she was not "privileged to instill into the minds of
these young children ... doctrines ... which are looked upon with
abhorrence by the vast majority of people living under the protection of our
Lord."93
Still today, parents' lack of belief can count against them in custody
disputes.94 In a 1998 South Carolina case, for example, a mother with a
history of writing fraudulent checks and failing to take her child to doctor's
appointments to check on the child's broken arm won custody over an
agnostic father, who had been recommended by the guardian ad litem.95 In
rejecting the father's claim that the family court focused too much on the
parties' religious beliefs, the appeals court stated that "[allthough the
religious beliefs of parents are not dispositive in a child custody dispute, they
are a factor relevant to determining the best interest of a child."96 A
England. The dubious award for 'first loser' was presented to the famous poet, Percy Bysshe
Shelley .... ").
9 1. Id. at 16 1 (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 702
(7th ed. 1857)).
92. Woman'sRed Creed Costs Her Children, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 30, 1936, at i (internal quotation
marks omitted).
93. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 631, 633-35 (2oo6) (compiling over seventy child-custody cases where the party
recognized by the court as more likely to provide a religious upbringing has prevailed). It can
also count against them in adoption. One NewJersey court would not let a couple adopt solely
because it thought their lack of belief in a Supreme Being rendered them unfit to be adoptive
parents. In reAdoption of"E," 271 A.2d 27, 30 (Essex County Ct. 1970). The Supreme Court of
NewJersey reversed. In reAdoption of "E," 279 A.2d 785, 796 (NJ. 1971 ).
95. Pountain v. Pountain, 503 S.E.2d 757, 759-61 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998). The guardian ad
litem called the decision a "really tough call." Id. at 759 (internal quotation marks omitted). His
main concern with the father was that the father was an agnostic. Id. In the end, the guardian
recommended the father because he "had a better value system." Id.
96. Id. at 761; see also, e.g., Staggs v. Staggs, 919 So. 2d 12, 1 19 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)
(ruling in mother's favor and noting that "[wihile [father] is an agnostic and testified that
religion is not important to him, [mother] testified that religion is very important to her");
Gancas v. Schultz, 683 A.2d 1207, 1213-14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (returning custody to mother
based on best interests of child, in part because mother testified that she takes daughter to
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Pennsylvania court similarly observed that "' [a] proper religious atmosphere
is an attribute of a good home and it contributes significantly to the ultimate
welfare of a child.' Where it appears that the religious training of the
children will cease upon placement in a given custodial setting, courts lean
in favor of the religious-minded contestant."97
Given this official state discrimination, it should not be surprising that
private discrimination and prejudice against atheists have also been
commonplace. In the 196os, 59% of Americans thought that people who
did not believe in God should not be allowed to teach in public schools,9
and 24% still believed that in the 198os.99 News stories about employers
terminating atheist employees-a chiropractor firing his receptionist on
discovering her atheism because "[t]here is no place for your thoughts,
opinions and beliefs on God in my office,"--- a financial-service company
terminating a worker when she complained that a picture of Christ
appeared on her computer days after two coworkers requested and received
a desk change on discovering her atheism,'-' a housepainter harassing his
church while "[f]ather, an admitted agnostic, does not attend church" and agreeing that
"[r]eligion, while not determinative, 'is an important matter and should be given some
consideration in child custody matters"' (quoting Boylan v. Boylan, 577 A.2d 218, 219 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 199o))).
97. Myers v. Myers, 14 Phila. Co. Rptr. 224, 257 (C.P. 1986) (citation omitted) (quoting
Commonwealth ex rel. Bendrick v. White, 169 A.2d 69, 73 (Pa. 1961)), affd men., 52o A.2d 68
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
98. Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith & Nat'l Op. Research Ctr., Univ. of Chi., Anti-
Semitism in the United States Survey, 1964 (Oct. 1964), available at iPoll Databank, Roper Ctr.
for Pub. Op. Research, Univ. of Conn., http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data-access/ipoll/
ipoll.html.
99. Am. Jewish Comm. & Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Anti-Semitism in the United States
Survey, 1981 (Jan. 1981), available at iPollDatabank, supra note 98.
soo. Kacey Cornell, Religion in the Workplace: An Atheist's Battle Against Discrimination,
EXAMINER.COM (May 14, 2009), http://www.examiner.com/atheism-in-dallas/religion-the-
workplace-an-atheist-s-battle-against-discrimination-pt-i (internal quotation marks omitted). A
receptionist at a chiropractor's office told a reporter that though she never discussed religion at
work, she was fired when her boss discovered her atheism via her husband's website. Id. When
interviewed, the doctor stated that he treats people regardless of their beliefs, but that he is a
person of faith, and "I do not want to hire anyone with a different world view." Kacey Cornell,
Religion in the Workplace: The Christian's Side of the Discrimination Story, EXAMINER.COM (May 17,
2009), http://www.examiner.com/atheism-in-dallas/religion-the-workplace-the-christian-s-side-
of-the-discrimination-story (internal quotation marks omitted).
ioi. Matthew Lane, Judge Reinstates Religious Discrimination Lawsuit Against ACS, CitiGroup,
SULLWAN-COUNTY.COM (July 24, 2003), http://www.sullivan-county.com/news/pat~quotes/
atheistfired.htm. Two women requested and were granted a request to move away from
Carletta Sims after learning that she was an official with American Atheists. Id. Two day later,
Sims found a picture of Jesus on her computer. Id. When Sims complained to her supervisor,
her supervisor fired her on the ground that she was a disturbance. Id.
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underling to repent and join his church until the employee quit, 02.
demonstrate that nonbelievers still face employment discrimination.'°0
Prominent private organizations, like the Boy Scouts of America, have
always excluded atheists from their ranks, and continue to do so. The Boy
Scouts' refusal to allow gay scoutmasters is now well known.104 Less widely
known is the Boy Scouts' policy of excluding nonbelievers as leaders or as
scouts. The Scouts' Declaration of Religious Principles states that "no boy
can grow into the best kind of citizenship without recognizing his obligation
to God."'°5 Accordingly, only those willing to swear an oath of duty to God
may join,' 6 and the Scouts have expelled longtime scoutmasters discovered
to be atheists on the ground that they cannot serve as a proper role model
for boys.'o7 This message about the incompatibility of atheism and
trustworthiness, loyalty, and moralityos comes not from just any organization
but from one that embodies all-American values; indeed, in modern society,
"Boy Scout" is essentially synonymous with wholesomeness. Moreover, the
Boy Scouts and its messages have received tremendous state sanction and
support.'0 9 The Boy Scouts have been chartered by Congress since 1916 and,
102. Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 903 P.2d 351 , 353-54 (Or. 1995).
103. See, e.g., Peter Wollheim, Atheists in Idaho; Non-believers on the Fringe, BOISE WEEKLY (Mar.
23, 2005), http://www.boiseweekly.com/boise/atheists-in-idaho/content?oid=92148o (reporting
that a member of the Idaho Atheist Alliance noted that "we have had members who have been
fired for being public about their atheism" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
104. It became widely known after the organization successfully challenged a public-
accommodation law outlawing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Boy Scouts of
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that the Boy Scouts had a free-association right to
exclude Dale as scoutmaster because his homosexuality would undermine their expressive
messages).
1o5 . Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1423 (N.D. Ill. 199o) (quoting
Reaffirmation of the Position of the Boy Scouts of America on "Duty to God") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
1o6. See, e.g., id. at 1417-18 (denying the defendant's motion to dismiss a lawsuit filed by a
seven-year-old boy who was denied admission to Tiger Cubs because he could not acknowledge
a duty to God); Randall v. Orange Cnty. Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 261, 262-63
(Cal. 1998) (ruling in favor of Scouts who revoked membership of two nine-year-old atheist
boys trying to advance from "Wolf" to "Bear" because they could not comply with religious
component of program).
107. Seaboum v. Coronado Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385, 39-91 (Kan.
1995) (ruling against plaintiff who had been involved with Boy Scouts for over twenty years, the
last as an assistant scoutmaster, and who was expelled from Boy Scouts two days after sending a
letter explaining that he did not believe in God).
1o8. The Scout Oath or Promise reads: "On my honor I will do my best / To do my duty to
God and my country / and to obey the Scout Law; / To help other people at all times; / To
keep myself physically strong, / mentally awake, and morally straight." Welsh, 742 F. Supp. at
1440. The Scout law is as follows: "A Scout is trustworthy ... loyal ... helpful ... friendly ...
courteous... kind ... obedient... cheerful ... thrifty.., brave ... clean ... reverent." Id.
io 9 . According to the official Boy Scout website, "204 members of the 112th Congress
participated in Scouting as a youth and/or adult leader." Facts About Scouting, BOY SCOUTS OF
AM., http://www.scouting.org/about/factsheets/scoutingfacts.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 201 1).
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under federal law, fall into the category of "Patriotic and National
Organizations."- o An attempt to rescind their congressional charter on
account of their discriminatory policies overwhelmingly failed.' Likewise,
no U.S. President has declined the honorary title of President of the Boy
Scouts,"' despite requests not to endorse an organization known for
blatantly discriminating against homosexuals and atheists."3 Such actions
have generated little public outcry." ,4
4. Persistent Distrust of Nonbelievers
Given this legacy, it is easier to understand why Americans today still
express enormous distrust of those who do not profess some religious belief.
One study noted that Americans are less accepting of atheists than any other
minority group-"and by a wide margin.""5 Social scientists have found a
consistently negative attitude towards atheists." 6 In particular, Americans
equate atheism with a lack of both morality and patriotism., 17 Consequently,
1 lo. 36 U.S.C. §§ 30901-30908 (2006). Other groups meriting a charter include veterans,
arts, and civic groups like American War Mothers, National Academy of Sciences, Congressional
Medal of Honor Society of the United States of America, and Big Brothers-Big Sisters of
America. See generally 36 U.S.C. §§ 10 10 1-240112 ("Patriotic and National Organizations").
1 1 1. The vote was 362 to 12. Jim Abrams, House Gives Boy Scouts Solid Vote on Charter, SUN
HERALD (Biloxi, Miss.), Sept. 14, 2ooo, at C1. Instead, Congress supported the Boy Scouts with
the Support Our Scouts Act of 2005, which guaranteed access to state facilities even if in
conflict with local antidiscrimination law, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2728 (2005) (repealed
2oo6), and the Boy Scouts of America Centennial Commemorative Coin Act, Pub. L. No. ii o-
363, 122 Stat. 4015 (2oo8).
112. Preparing for the Next Century: The Legacy of the Boy Scouts Includes Patriotism and
Outdoorsmanship, but Also Excluding Gays and Atheists, WIs. ST.J., Dec. 21, 2oo9, at Ai, available at
2009 WLNR 25712351.
113. Press Release, Am. Humanist Ass'n, President-Elect Obama Asked To Turn Down Boy
Scouts of America (Jan. 13, 2009), available at http://www.americanhumanist.org/news/
details/ 2009-0 1-president-elect-obama-asked-to-tum-down-boy-scouts-of-america (including text
of open letter to Obama signed by nineteen atheist, agnostic, and nontheistic organizations).
114. To the extent people disapprove, it is usually based on the Boy Scouts' discrimination
against gays. See, e.g., Members of Congress Call on BSA To End Its Discrimination Against Gays and
Lesbians, SCOUTING NEWS (Feb. 6, 201o), http://www.scoutingnews.org/2010/02/o
6 /congress-
end-discrimination-policy/.
115. Penny Edgell,Joseph Gerteis & Douglas Hartmann, Atheists as "Other": Moral Boundaries
and Cultural Membership in American Society, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 211, 217 (2oo6); see also id. at 230
("Atheists are at the top of the list of groups that Americans find problematic in both public
and private life, and the gap between acceptance of atheists and acceptance of other racial and
religious minorities is large and persistent. It is striking that the rejection of atheists is so much
more common than rejection of other stigmatized groups.").
116. See, e.g., STEVE FARKAS ET AL., PUB. AGENDA, FOR GOODNESS' SAKE: WHY SO MANY WANT
RELIGION To PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN AMERICAN LIFE passim (2001), available at http://www.
publicagenda.org/files/pdf/for-goodnesssake.pdf; Edgell, Gerteis & Hartmann, supra note
1'5, at 217.
117. See Edgell, Gerteis & Hartmann, supra note 115, at 228.
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as the polls and personal stories of atheists demonstrate, atheists are viewed
with suspicion and hostility and suffer discrimination and social ostracism.
Public opinion polls are very revealing.is When people are asked
whether their overall opinion of atheists is favorable or unfavorable, roughly
half of Americans regularly answer that they view atheists unfavorably.',9
Framing the question slightly differently as to whether their view of atheists
is positive, negative, or neutral, 45% of Americans still responded that their
view was negative.- ° While Americans also rate other religious minority
groups negatively, none of them, not Muslims, not Hindus, not Mormons,
rank as poorly as atheists.121
In fact, anywhere from one-quarter to one-half of twenty-first century
Americans believe morality and atheism are mutually exclusive.s2 To these
people, religion is the foundation of morality, 23 and those who have none
118. Of course, certain caveats apply when looking at polls. There is a margin of error. The
wording of a question may affect results. National polls do not capture regional differences, nor
do they isolate variables such as income, education, and race. Data needs to be contextualized
and interpreted. Still, polls provide a snapshot of Americans' views.
119. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE & PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE &
THE PRESS, VIEWS OF RELIGIOUS SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 22 (2009) [hereinafter PEW
2009 SURVEY], available at http://pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Topics/Religious.Affiliation/
Muslim/surveyo9o9 .pdf. Here is the exact question and the responses from the August 2oo9
survey: "Now thinking about some specific religious groups ... Is your overall opinion of
[Atheists, that is people who don't believe in God,] very favorable [6%], mostly favorable
[23%], mostly UNfavorable 123%], or very unfavorable [26%]?" Id. at 21-22 (first alteration in
original). Twenty-one percent refused to answer. Id. at 22. When the same question was asked
in August 2007, the responses were: 7% very favorable; 28% mostly favorable; 23% mostly
unfavorable; 30% very unfavorable; and 12% can't rate/refused. Id.
12o. Gallup Org., Poll (Mar. 2oo8), available at iPoll Databank, supra note 98 (finding that
people's view of atheists were 5% very positive; 8% somewhat positive; 41% neutral; 16%
somewhat negative; 29% very negative; and s% no opinion).
12 1. While 49% of people rated atheists unfavorably, the number that rated other religious
groups unfavorably was significantly lower: Muslims (32%), Mormons (26%), Hindus (21%),
Buddhists (20%), Evangelical Christians (17%), Jews (11%), Catholics (13%). PEW 2009
SURVEY, supra note 1 19, at 21-23.
122. This stereotype of the immoral atheist is unfounded. See Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi,
Morality and Immorality Among the Irreligious, in ATHEISM & SECULARITY 1 13, 134 (Phil Zuckerman
ed., 2010) ("The claim that atheists are somehow likely to be immoral or dishonest has long
been disproved."); Federico Varese & Meir Yaish, The Importance of Being Asked: The Rescue ofJews
in Nazi Europe, 12 RATIONALITY & SOc'Y 307, 320 (2000) (finding that "the less religious the
respondents, the more likely they were to help" persecuted Jews); Phil Zuckerman, Atheism,
Secularity, and Well-Being: How the Findings of Social Science Counter Negative Stereotypes and
Assumptions, 3/6 SOC. COMPASS 949, 953 (2009) (noting that studies show that atheists and
secular people are "markedly less nationalistic; less prejudiced, less anti-Semitic, less racist, less
dogmatic, less ethnocentric, less close-minded, and less authoritarian").
123. See, e.g., FARKAS ET AL., supra note 116, at io- 1 (concluding that for many Americans,
"[t]o be religious ... means to be a moral human being"); Edgell, Gerteis & Hartmann, supra
note 1 15, at 214 (describing the American assumption that religious people of whatever faith
are understood to be worthy of trust and to be good Americans).
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are immoral.124 When asked "Do you think someone can be a moral person
and be an atheist, or not?," over a quarter said "no.".25 When asked whether
"[i]t is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good
values," over half of Americans regularly answer "yes."12
6
While Americans accept that their particular religious beliefs are not a
precondition to morality, they deem some kind of religious foundation
necessary.1 2 7 Thus, many Americans have a particular antipathy for
nonbelievers, who in their eyes lack this moral foundation. One atheist
described how people have physically backed away from him upon
discovering his beliefs.'18 Another in the Bible Belt wrote: "Many times I've
been told, 'What stops you from going out and killing people?"' 29 The
stereotype of the immoral atheist helps explain why so many of the atheist
billboards and bus advertisements are focused on spreading the message
that nonbelievers do not sport "horns and a long tail" and that people can
be good, moral, and ethical without believing in God.13°
124. Edgell, Gerteis & Hartmann, supra note 115, at 228 (describing how people may
associate atheists with, for example, criminality or excessive individualism, but that generally
atheists represent a general lack of morality, albeit not always in the same way); see also Psalms
14:1 (Revised Standard Version) ("The fool says in his heart, 'There is no God.' They are
corrupt, they do abominable deeds, there is none that does good.").
125. Princeton Survey Research Assocs. Int'l & Newsweek, Poll (Mar. 2007), available at iPoll
Databank, supra note 98 (68% yes; 26% no; 6% don't know); Princeton Survey Research Assocs.
Int'l & Newsweek, Poll (Aug. 2oo6), available at iPoll Databank supra note 98 (68% yes; 26% no;
6% don't know). The numbers were not so different twenty years ago: 59% yes; 32% no; 9%
don't know. CBS News/N.Y. Times, Poll (Sept. 1984), available at iPollDatabank, supra note 98.
126. Pew Global Attitudes Project & Princeton Survey Research Assocs. Int'l, Poll (Apr.
2007), available at iPoilDatabank, supra note 98 (finding that 57% believed it is "[n]ecessary to
believe in God to be moral/have good values"; 41% thought it is "[n]ot necessary to believe in
God to be moral/have good values"; and 2% don't know/refused); Pew Research Ctr. for the
People & the Press, Political Typology Poll (Dec. 2004), available at iPollDatabank, supra note 98
(finding that 51 % of Americans believed "[i ] t is necessary to believe in God to be moral and
have good values"; 46% thought "[ilt is not necessary to believe in God to be moral and have
good values"; and 3% neither/don't know).
127. Press Release, Univ. of Minn., Atheists Identified as America's Most Distrusted
Minority, According to New U of M Study (Mar. 28, 2oo6), available at http://wwwi.umn.edu/
news/news-releases/2oo6/URRELEASEMIG_281 6.html (providing a statement from the
lead researcher noting that "[i]t seems most Americans believe that diversity is fine, as long as
every one [sic] shares a common 'core' of values that make [sic] them trustworthy-and in
America, that 'core' has historically been religious" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
128. Tom Arcaro, The Stigma of Being an Atheist: An Empirical Study on the New Atheist
Movement and Its Consequences, 15 SKEPTIC MAG., no. 4, 2010 at 5o, 55 (reporting one man's
experience: "I've had people literally, physically BACK away from me upon hearing I am atheist.
My children were told to run away from our evil home.").
129. Id. A Kentucky billboard, depicting a boy pointing a gun at the viewer, provides a
visual representation of this assumption, where the tag line is: "If God doesn't matter to him, do
you?" Billboard Wars, DANGEROUS TALK, http://www.dangeroustalk.net/billboard-wars.html (last
visited Nov. 1, 2011).
13
o
. Holly Yan, Dallas-Area Atheists Discuss Their Outlook, Relationships, DALL. MORNING NEWS,
Apr. 3, 2009 (on file with author). In explaining why his atheist group sponsored a "Don't
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; Atheism is linked not only with a lack of values but also with a lack of
patriotism.'3' "In public life, many Americans believe now... that affirming
a religious identity is an important way of 'being American .... '"'135 When
asked whether atheism was patriotic, unpatriotic, or neither, 39% of
Americans in 2oo8 told pollsters that not believing in God was "very
unpatriotic."'33 Americans also rated atheists below Muslims, homosexuals,
recent immigrants, and other groups as "shar[ing] their vision of American
society."134 "Simply put, many Americans would likely agree with the
sentiment that 'to be irreligious ... [is] to be unAmerican."
' 35
These assumptions-that atheists are immoral and un-American-have
ramifications in the private and public sphere. A "standard measure of...
prejudice" against a group is asking people how they would feel if their child
married someone from that group.,36 In the United States, Americans
express great reluctance about their children marrying atheists. People were
more upset about a possible family tie with an atheist than with any other
religious or racial minority group. 137
believe in God? You are not alone" billboard, Terry McDonald explained that "[w]e'd like to
show Christians we don't have horns and a tail .... We're just normal people." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
131. Edgell, Gerteis & Hartmann, supra note 115, at 212 (noting religion's "association
with morality and citizenship"); id. at 214 (noting religion's association with "being a good
American").
132. Id. at 216.
133. Another 4% stated it was somewhat unpatriotic. Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research,
True Patriot Survey (Aug. 2004), available at iPoll Databank, supra note 98; see also CBS News &
N.Y. Times, Poll (Sept. 1984), available at iPoll Databank, supra note 98 (reporting that 22% of
people answered "no" to "Do you think someone can be patriotic if they don't believe in
God?"); N.Y. Times, Poll (June 1983), available at iPoll Databank, supra note 98 (providing that
24% of people answered "no" to "Can someone be patriotic if they do not believe in God?").
134. Edgell, Gerteis & Hartmann, supra note 115, at 212 ("From a list of groups that also
includes Muslims, recent immigrants, and homosexuals, Americans name atheists as those least
likely to share their vision of American society.").
135. Alidoosti, supra note 25, at 1o (alteration in original) (quoting R. Hart, An Unquiet
Desperation: Rhetorical Aspects of "Popular" Atheism in the United States, Q. J. SPEECH 64(1 ) , 35
(1978)).
136. Edgell, Gerteis & Hartmann, supra note 1 13, at 217; see also Pew Research Ctr. & NPR,
Social Trends Racial Attitudes in America Survey (Oct. 2oo9), available at iPoll Databank, supra
note 98 (reporting that when asked how they would react to a member of their close family
marrying an atheist, 34% said they would be fine; 38% said they "[w]ould be bothered but
would come to accept it"; and 24% said they "[wiould not be able to accept it"); Wash. Post &
Kaiser & Harvard Univ., Racial Attitudes Survey (Mar. 2001), available at iPoll Databank, supra
note 98 (reporting that, in response to the same question, "31% would be fine with it... ; 39%
would be bothered but would come to accept it; 30% would not be able to accept it").
137. Edgell, Gerteis & Hartmann, supra note 115, at 217-18. Asked if they would
disapprove of their child marrying an atheist, 47.6% of those interviewed said "yes." Id. at 218.
Asked the same question about Muslims, the "yes" responses fell to 33.5%. Id. The "yes"
responses for African-Americans, Asian-Americans, Hispanics, and Jews were 27.2%, 18.5%,
18. 5 %, and 11.8 %, respectively. Id.
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Americans also readily admit that they do not want atheists in positions
of power. Poll after poll shows that Americans are less willing to elect an
atheist as President than a member of any other group, establishing once
again that atheists are the most negatively rated minority in the United
States.'38 Roughly half of Americans told pollsters that they would not vote
for an otherwise qualified atheist nominated by their own party.39 The
numbers are even higher if the atheist is not described as party nominated
or well qualified.,4o In comparison to the 53% who would not vote for an
atheist President, far fewer said they would not vote for someone who was
homosexual (43%), Hispanic (12%), a woman (i%), Jewish (7%), or
black (4%).141 In another poll, 87% of Americans agreed that a strong belief
in God was an important leadership trait for the next President.141 This
distrust is not limited to the Presidency. In 2010, 58% of Americans told
pollsters that they would not be comfortable with a Supreme Court Justice
who is an atheist.,43 In short, "atheists represent a symbolic 'other' against
which some Americans define themselves as good people and worthy
citizens."44
138. Id. at 215 (noting that the gap in willingness to vote for atheists versus other religious
minorities is "large and persistent" (citing FARKAS ET AL., supra note 116)); see also id.
(concluding "that [the] widespread political rejection of [nonbelievers] provides a 'glaring
exception' to the general rule of increasing social tolerance" (citing FARKAS ET AL., supra note
1 16, at 37)).
139. Princeton Survey Research Assocs. Int'l & Newsweek, Poll (July 2oo8), available at iPoll
Databank, supra note 98 (finding that 51% would not vote for an atheist presidential candidate
who was nominated by their party and qualified for the job); Gallup & USA Today, Poll (June
201 1), available at iPoll Databank, supra note 98 (49% would not vote for party-nominated,
generally well-qualified presidential candidate who happens to be an atheist); Gallup & USA
Today, Poll (Mar. 2007), available at iPoll Databank, supra note 98 (48%); Gallup & USA Today,
Poll (Feb. 2007), available at iPollDatabank, supra note 98 (53%); see also Pew Research Ctr. for
the People & the Press & Princeton Survey Research Assocs. Int'l, Pew Forum on Religion and
Public Life Survey (May 2011), available at iPoll Databank, supra note 98 (61 % said that they
would be less likely to support a Presidential candidate who does not believe in God).
140. Princeton Survey Research Assocs. Int'l & Newsweek, Poll (Mar. 2007), available at iPoll
Databank, supra note 98 (62% answered "no" to the question "Would you vote for a political
candidate who says he or she is an atheist, or not?"); Princeton Survey Research Assoc.
Int'l/Newsweek Poll (Aug. 2oo6), available at iPoll Databank, supra note 98 (56% answered "no"
to the same question).
141. Gallup/USA Today Poll (Feb. 2007), available at iPoll Databank, supra note 98
(reporting responses of individuals who, when asked if their party nominated a generally well-
qualified person for president who happened to be.. . , would vote for that person).
142. Ctr. for Pub. Leadership of the John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov't, Harvard Univ. & U.S.
News & World Report & Yankelovich, Poll (Sept. 2007), available at Woll Databank, supra note
98.
143. Fox NEWS, OPINION DYNAMIcs POLL (20O), available at http://www.foxnews.com/
projects/pdf/04281o SCOTUS.pdf.
144. Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, supra note 115, at 214.
2012]
IOWA LAWREVJEW
The negative associations are so strong'45 that they have found their way
into the very definition of atheism. Thus, according to the American Heritage
College Dictionary, "atheism" means "l.a. Disbelief in or denial of the
existence of God or gods. b. The doctrine that there is no God or gods," but
it also means "2. Godlessness; immorality."146 The second definition of
"atheism" in the Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language Unabridged is "godlessness esp. in conduct."'47 At least the Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary notes that the "ungodliness, wickedness"
definition of "atheism" is archaic.48
This discrimination against atheists is often first-generation
discrimination. That is, the prejudice is conscious, deliberate, and
unashamed.,49 Unlike discrimination against someone because of race, sex,
or religion, there is little social stigma attached to disliking or denigrating
someone because he or she does not believe in God.'s5 In addition, first-
generation discrimination can erupt into violence; atheists who have come
out of the closet have been threatened's' and assaulted.,52 Assuming atheists
145. See, e.g., Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 532 F.3 d 1209, 1234 (11th Cir. 2008)
(comparing atheists in the Bible Belt to pedophiles in terms of the loathing they could
provoke), rev'd, 13o S. Ct. 1662 (2010).
146. AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 89 (4 th ed. 2002).
147. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 137 (1993).
148. Atheism Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
atheism (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
149. See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 46o, 466 (2001) (describing first-generation discrimination as
deliberate exclusion based on conscious stereotypes and second-generation discrimination as
unconscious and based on cognitive bias, structures of decisionmaking, and patterns of
interaction).
15o. See, e.g., Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 742 F. Supp. 1413, 1416 n.s (N.D. Ill. 199
o )
("Cases involving allegations of racial and gender-based discrimination, while now
commonplace, rarely provoke the expressed defense that such discrimination is justified. In
contrast, religious discrimination-including discrimination against those who do not believe in
God-remains openly defended by some in a way that most of our society no longer tolerates
with respect to other forms of discrimination."); Gervais, supra note 13, at 27 ("In contrast to
many other kinds of prejudice, anti-atheist prejudice is not widely stigmatized.").
151. Outspoken atheists regularly receive death threats. E-mail from Shawn Joset to Fred
Edwords, Nat'l Dir., United Coal. of Reason (Feb. 14, 2010, 2:26 PM) (on file with author)
(describing threats); E-mail from Mike Newdow to author (Jan. 13, 2011, 10:17 AM) (on file
with author) (describing receipt of what appeared to be a pipe bomb in the mail, which
necessitated closing down the entire post office and the block around it); see also Death Threats:
Just Another Risk of Atheist Blogging, ATHEIST REVOLUTION (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.atheistrev.
com/2009/io/death-threats-just-another-isk-of.html. But so do ordinary people whose beliefs
have become known. An atheist in the U.S. military "was sent home early from Iraq because of
threats from fellow soldiers." Neela Banerjee, Soldier Sues Army, Saying His Atheism Led to Threats,
N.Y. TIMES, April 26, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/0 4 /26/us/26atheist.html.
152. One atheist was killed by his housemate who explained that "I did it because he was
evil; he was not a believer." Joel Thurtell, Man Is Not Competent To Stand Trial DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Dec. 30, 2004. A ten-year-old girl who refused to recite "under God" in the Pledge was
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are unpatriotic and immoral, people see them as less worthy and their
mistreatment justified.'53 A few stories of atheists in America may serve to
demonstrate the potential repercussions of nonbelief in a religious nation.
B. PERSONAL STORES OFNONBELEVERS
1. A Story of Political Exclusion
David Habecker moved to Estes Park, Colorado in the 1970s. He was
the owner and operator of the Appenzell Inn in Estes Park and joined the
Chamber of Commerce and the Estes Area Lodging Association.'54 He has
been President and Lion of the Year of the Estes Park Lions Club and
volunteered for other civic groups as well, including the Wildflower Music
Festival Committee and the Aspenfest Committee.'55 He has participated in
several choirs and in a barbershop quartet.,56 He also served intermittently
as an Estes Park Town Trustee over a twenty-year period.,57 Most recently, he
was reelected to a four-year term in 2002.158 As a Town Trustee, "Habecker
voted on routine matters such as budgets, appropriations, and hiring and
firing of the Town Manager and Town Attorney."'59
Then the Mayor announced in May 2004 that henceforth Trustee
Board meetings, which are open to the public, would begin with the Pledge
of Allegiance., 6° At first Habecker stood up and joined, albeit without saying
"under God."' 6' Soon, however, "Habecker felt hypocritical reciting even
this redacted version of the Pledge."' 6' Consequently, starting in September,
Habecker sat silently during the Pledge.,6s According to Habecker, "My
protest has nothing to do with respect for the flag, for my fellow board
pushed up against a building by a classmate who also made the sign of the cross over her and
said, "[e]veryone has to believe in God." Exhibit C (Affidavit of Bailey Wood Frei) to Plaintiffs'
Motion for Protective Order, Freedom from Religion Found. v. Hanover Sch. Dist., No. i :07-cv-
3 5 6-JM (D.N.H. Jan. 22, 2oo8) (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. These same stereotypes no doubt also operate unconsciously, leading to the more
subtle, second-generation cognitive bias type of discrimination. Cf Sturm, supra note 149, at
468 (noting that first-generation discrimination often coexists with second-generation
discrimination).
154. Candidates for Town Trustee, TowN OF EsTEs PARK COLO., http://www.estesnet.com/
TownClerk/Election/CandidateBio2olo.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (follow Candidate Bio












members, for any member of the community, or for any religion."164
Instead, "My protest concerns the unconstitutional religious test that the
pledge of allegiance becomes with the addition of the words 'under God.'
... [Adding under God] was meant as a religious test, pure and simple, and
to this day, few elected officials will stay elected if they object.' ' 65 In short, "It
was a conscientious objection on my part. To take a loyalty oath before the
meeting starts-that's not American . ... This country was founded on
religious tolerance. This wasn't religious tolerance."'
66
When Habecker's actions became known, three Estes Park residents
formed a committee to recall him from office.' 67 Their recall platform
emphasized Habecker's unwillingness to recite the Pledge, stating that as a
result, "[e]lectors suffer a loss of confidence in Mr. Habecker's ability to
represent citizen's [sic] pride, patriotism, and common decency. . .. His
defiant behavior occurs because the phrase '... under God ... ' offends
him."' 68 Habecker lost his seat by a vote of 903 to 605.,69 It was the first
recall in the town's eighty-seven-year history.7o When he ran for town
trustee again in 2010, he came in dead last.'7'
2. A Story of Social Ostracism
Thirteen-year-old Nicole Smalkowski was originally very excited when
her family moved to an eighty-acre ranch in Hardesty, Oklahoma. 72 A first-
rate athlete, she was the only girl on the public school's football team, and
when basketball season arrived, she also joined the girls' basketball team.73
At the end of the first basketball game, everyone-all the players from her
team and the opposing team, all the teachers and school officials, all the
spectators in the stands-bowed their heads for the Lord's Prayer.'74 She did
not join in because she thought it would be disrespectful to them and to
164. Lisa Pogue, A Town Divided: Trustee's Protest Fuels Animosity, ESTES PARK TRAIL-GAZETTE
(Sept. 12, 2oo8), http://www.eptrail.com/news/ci_12799967 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
165. Id.
166. Voters Recall Pledge Objector, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2005), http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2005/mar/23/20050323-110303-171 I r/ (quoting David Habecker)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Habecker, 518 F.3 d at 1221.
168. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
169. Voters Recall Pledge Objector, supra note 166.
170. Pledge Protester Faces Recall Vote, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2004), http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2004/dec/2 1/20041221-122302-90 22r/.
171. John Cordsen, New Trustees, Incumbent Are Sworn In, ESTES PARK TRAiL-GAZETE (Apr.
29, 201o), http://www.eptrail.com/estes-park-news/ci_14985654.
172. 20/2 0: Seeing and Believing: The Power of Faith (ABC television broadcast May 11, 2007),
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herself.'75 When she explained to the coach that she didn't believe in God,
the coach responded, "Go to the locker room then."7 6
School officials kicked Nicole off the team the next day on the grounds
that she had stolen someone's sneakers.'77 They did not inform Nicole, who
only found out when she showed up for the next scheduled game.,7
8
Subsequently, Nicole became the target of derision and intimidation.'79
Some students called her a devil worshiper. 8o One student announced when
he saw her that he was going to get a gun.' s' The school did nothing to stop
the harassment; on the contrary, teachers told Nicole that "this is a Christian
country and if you don['] t like it you can get out."' 8
A year later, Nicole was allowed back on the team; this time when
everyone huddled together to pray, Nicole stepped aside and recited the
Pledge of Allegiance without the "under God."83 The following Monday, the
school suspended her, claiming that she had threatened a team member; no
notice or due process was provided.'8 4
In the end, Nicole's parents decided to homeschool all three of their
children rather than risk their safety at school.' 85 So now instead of sports,
Nicole focuses on music.' 8 6 She says that she is disappointed about leaving
175. Id.
176. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Id.; Complaint at 5-6, Smalkowski v. Hardesty Pub. Sch. Dist., No. o6CVoo8 45 (W.D.
Okla.), 2oo6 WL 2919119.
178. Complaint, supra note 177, at 6.
179. Id.
18o. 20/20, supra note 172.
181. Charleyski, Reply to Its Even Worse if You Are a Liberal and Have No Gods, DEMOCRATIC
UNDERGROUND (Dec. 09, 2005, 5:56 AM), http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/
duboard.php?az=showmesg&forum= 1 73&topic-id=1 263&mesgid= 1510.
182. Id. According to Nicole's father, when he went to talk to the principal, the principal
assaulted him and then the county filed charges against the father. Nicole's father said, "The
D.A. was willing to drop the charges if I left the county. The charges were switched from a
misdemeanor to a felony when I refused." Id. The father was subsequently acquitted by ajury of
all charges. Austin Cline, Atheist Acquitted on Assault Charges After Being Harassed by Local
Christians, ABOUT.COM (June 30, 2oo6), http://atheism.about.com/b/2oo6/o6/ 3 o/atheist-
acquitted-on-assault-charges-afterbeing-harassedby-local-christians.htm
183. 20/20, supra note 165. On Nicole's website, you can see a video of a circle of girls from
both teams, arms around each other, heads bent, reciting the Lord's Prayer, and one lone girl
standing several feet apart reciting the Pledge. Nicole Smalkowski, Against the Law To Pray,
MYSPACE (Mar. 31, 2oo6), http://www.myspace.com/nicoletheproudathiest/videos/against-the-
law-to-pray-in-school/2 5 7673.
184. Complaint, supra note 177, at 8.




school, particularly because she can no longer pursue a college athletic
scholarship.187
3. Stories of Hiding
Rather than risk the consequences, many atheists keep their views to
themselves. ,8 While this secrecy may avoid external conflict, it often creates
internal turmoil. The letter below, seeking advice on the "Friendly Atheist"
website reflects the dilemma many nonbelievers have in deciding whether to
come out or not.,9
Dear Richard,
I've been an atheist for several years now, and the only person
in my family who knows is my sister, and she shares my doubts,
though perhaps not quite as strongly as I do.
Every year around Christmastime I get anxious over how in the
world I am going to escape Mass on Christmas. My parents are not
fanatically religious, but my grandparents are, and I'm always hard
pressed to find a way to not attend. My personal thoughts on the
holiday are that a couple of days eating and spending time with
187. Id. The sudden hostility that greets revelation of their beliefs is a recurring theme in
atheist narratives. After a nursing student disclosed her religious beliefs, classmates shunned
her:
The next day, a classmate whom I had personally tutored that normally sat by me
now refused. She sat on the complete other end of the classroom and refused to
make eye contact. ... Lately it has been harder and harder to get any of my
classmates (except for the only other atheist in the class) to work with me.
Richard Wade, Ask Richard: Atheist Nursing Students Treated as Pariahs by Fellow Students, FRIENDLY
ATHEIST (Jan. 22, 201 o), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/friendlyatheist.com/2o1o/o1/22/
ask-richard-atheist-nursing-students-treated-as-pariahs-by-fellow-students. Another nonbeliever
writes about how socially alone he and his family are:
I have been an atheist for several years now. I have three younger children, all
under the age of ten. .. . I live in a small town .... My family and I are dying
socially with little to no one who believes like we do or even accepts us for our
beliefs. Our kids cannot play with the neighbors because they hate us and tell my
kids they will bum in hell.... My kids need other kids to play with .... I would cry
if my anger at the situation wasn't overcoming the emotion.
Richard Wade, Ask Richard: An Atheist Hesitates to Visit a Unitarian Universalist Congregation,
FRIENDLY ATHEIST (Apr. 13, 201 o), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/friendlyatheist.com/2o10/
04/1 3 /ask-richard-an-atheist-hesitates-to-visit-a-unitarian-universalist-congregation.
188. See Peter Wollheim, Atheists in Idaho: Non-believers on the Fringe, BOISE WEEKLY (Mar. 23,
2005), http://www.boiseweekly.com/boise/atheists-in-idaho/content?oid=92 48o (noting that
atheists "liv[e] a double life").
189. The terminology of "coming out of the closet" is taken from the gay rights movement.
See generally, e.g., Whitney Anspach et al., The Other Closet?: Atheists, Homosexuals, and the Lateral
Appropriation of Discursive Capital, 4 CRITICAL DISCOURSE STUD. 95 (2007).
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family is a good thing, but I can't be honest with myself and still
attend church.
I've been toying with the idea of telling my parents .... Telling
them would help with the struggle I have around the holidays ....
"Coming out of the closet" as an atheist has been something I have
gone back and forth about for so long, and I wonder if finally
saying it out loud would actually help or not. Would it just be better
to keep my mouth shut and tolerate the religious services around
Christmastime? After all, I don't encounter them any other time of
year. I just feel like I'm being dishonest with myself, and that my
parents don't know who I really am.
Thanks so much,
Janice190
Some nonbelievers feel that dissembling is their only viable option. One
participant at the first African Americans for Humanism Conference who
gave his first but not last name emphasized that " [i]f I want a second date or
a job in the community, I won't say I'm an atheist."'9g Another conference
participant agreed that it is "almost impossible to admit that you're a black
atheist"; she explained, "[w]e have to hide our non-belief, otherwise we are
excluded. And if we give voice to any objection or doubt, we're ostracized
and isolated .... So any time religion comes up, it's simpler to just change
the subject or say nothing if you can't bring yourself to fake an 'amen."'192
True to her statement, she requested anonymity: "[D]on't use my name
'cause my mother told me when she saw me reading God is Not Great that if
any of her children actually believed 'that mess,' she'd have one less
child.",93
19o. Richard Wade, Ask Richard: Critical Mass: Atheists Facing the Unwelcome Christmas Ritual,
FRIENDLY ATHEIST (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/friendlyatheist/2oo9/12/
o 1/ask-richard-critical-mass-atheists-facing-the-unwelcome-christmas-ritual.
191. Oduah & Bohn, supra note 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
192. Jamila Bey, Black Women Who Use the "A" Word, ROOT (May 19, 201o), http://www.
theroot.com/views/black-women-who-use-word; see also Sikivu Hutchinson, "Out of the Closet":
Black Atheists, BLACK AGENDA REP. (May i2, 2009), http://www.blackagendareport.com/
content/"out-closet-black-atheists ("For black atheists, actively breaking with religious tradition
is an even graver rejection than that of white intellectuals .... This is partly due to the fact that
the history of African American civil and human rights resistance is heavily steeped in Judeo-
Christian religious dogma .... If being black and being Christian are synonymous, then being
black, female and religious (whatever the denomination) is practically compulsory. Black
women with children who don't fall in line, who raise their children as atheists, may find their
race credentials revoked."); Your Pal Satan, Comment to The Invisibility of the Black Atheist,
WORDS WRATH (May 28, 2oo8, 8:54 PM), http://wordsofwrath.blogspot.com/2oo8/o 5 /
invisibility-of-blackatheist.html/showComment= 12322544 4ooo#c84365 4 4 351337092301 ("I
am a black, lesbian agnostic.... My family accepts the homosexuality, but the agnosticism is the
dirty, little secret.").
193. Bey, supranote 192.
2012]
IOWA LAWREVIEW
Because people often have been stunned by the malice directed at them
when they tell family members, Richard Wade, the retired psychologist to
whom the Dear Richard letter was addressed, recommends that atheists
proceed with caution.194 One study found that of those who came out as
atheist, half in San Francisco and two thirds in Alabama and Idaho reported
difficulties with friends and families as a result.95 A focus group of atheists
who had come out reported a range of negative repercussions from their
disclosure,'96 from family members not trusting them around the younger
members of the family,197 to one being shunned by a classmate on the same
dormitory floor,s5 to another having to resign from his lodge and losing a
close friend,'99 to one's wife deciding to separate from him.200 As one atheist
noted, "It's the A-word .... You commit social suicide as a black person
when you say you're an atheist."2
°1
If family and friends may "suddenly change[] from loving and
supportive, to cold, rejecting, hostile, and even vicious," 20 and classmates,
194. Richard Wade, Ask Richard: Young Atheist Considers Coming Out to His Grandparents,
FRIENDLY ATHEIST (Jan. 26, 20o), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/friendlyatheist/2010/01/
26/ask-richard-young-atheist-considers-coming-out-to-his-grandparents/ ("Over and over, so
many of the stories relate how when the atheists came out, their families suddenly changed
from loving and supportive, to cold, rejecting, hostile, and even vicious. The years that the
atheist has spent being loving, supportive and loyal to the family apparently count for absolutely
nothing, as if that never took place. They are instantly regarded as vile monsters simply because
of their membership in a belief category. Their actual behavior or conduct has nothing to do
with it. While the atheists may have expected some upset from the family, they are often
stunned by the intensity of the reaction."). In his blog, Words of Wrath, Wrath James White
complained, "In [most African American] communities you find more tolerance towards
gangbusters, drug addicts, and prostitutes, who pray to God for forgiveness than for honest
productive citizens who deny the existence of God." The Invisibility of the Black Atheist, WORDS OF
WRATH (May 28, 2oo8, 10:37 PM), http://wordsofwrath.blogspot.com/2oo8/o5/invisibility-of-
black-atheist.html.
195. BRUCE E. HUNSBERGER & BOB ALTEMEVER, ATHEISTS: A GROUNDBREAKING STUDY OF
AMERICA'S NONBELIEVERS 55 (oo6).
196. Alidoosti, supra note 25, at 71. One participant shared the coming out story of a
friend, whose very upset mother reacted by saying "Why couldn't you just be gay? That would
have been better." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. Id. at 67 (noting that after disclosing their atheism, family members were
"apprehensive about leaving children alone with the participants").
198. Id. at 72.
199. Id. at 58 ("I've lost, for instance, the fraternity here with the [organization] ... there
was one guy, that we were very good friends and brothers in the lodge, who after - I was in
charge of the lodge and he was second in command - and so when I left he was in charge and
he basically, over a period of about two months, stopped talking to me for, for no reason except
that, you know, he doesn't like that I'm not a, not a believer.").
200. Id. ("The greatest cost is, just recently, the wife and I just separated and she states that,
you know, that my atheism is a big, you know, is a big, is a big decision for the separation and,
you know, the way that it affects her and her family. Her family is very religious and, you know,
she thinks it's going to - my atheism's going to impinge on her inheritance.").
201. Oduah & Bohn, supra note 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).
202. Wade, supra note 194.
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colleagues, and neighbors can likewise turn on them,°23 it becomes
understandable why nonbelievers may decide to hide their beliefs. Many
leaders in the nonbelieving community have commented on how people
usually prefer to just keep silent, even at the expense of their religious
conscience.2 0 4 As the stories of Habecker, Nicole, and others illustrate, they
fear not hurt feelings, but political powerlessness, lost opportunities, social
ostracism, and the threat of physical assault.
C. PuRPosEs OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLA SE
Clearly then, atheists in America are a stigmatized group, and
stereotypes about them affect their standing in the community and their
ability to fully comply with their beliefs. Should the Establishment Clause
play any role in ameliorating this situation? The answer is yes because
among the multiple goals of the Establishment Clause is protecting those
whose beliefs do not conform to the dominant religion. Accordingly,
regardless of whether atheism is a religion or not,2 0 5 the Supreme Court has
long held that the Establishment Clause's protection for religious minorities
extends to nonbelievers.
There is not one single purpose of the Establishment Clause any more
than there is one single purpose of the Free Speech Clause.2o 6 At a
minimum, however, the Establishment Clause can be seen as offering at least
three kinds of protection.207 First, it protects civil society from the turmoil
that follows when the government establishes religion. As James Madison
argued in his Memorial and Remonstrance, disestablishment brings
"moderation and harmony," while establishment results in "torrents of
blood."o° 8 The Supreme Court describes this interest as "guard[ing] against
203. See supra notes 172-87.
204. Dave Silverman, Coming Out: The Other Closet, AM. ATHEISTS, http://www.atheists.org/
atheism/comingout (last visited Oct. 30, 201 1) ("Many of us ... hide in the shadows due to
fear of hostility and aversion to confrontations."). On his website, Richard Dawkins urges
atheists to "COME OUT" of the closet: "You'll feel liberated." OUT CAMPAIGN, http://
outcampaign.org/ (last visited Oct. 30, 201 1).
205. See infra notes 221-24. Some have argued that atheism should be considered a
religion. See infra notes 370-73. While a fascinating question, it is not one that is necessary to
resolve for purposes of this paper since the Establishment Clause extends to nonbelievers
regardless.
2o6. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 125-30
(1989) (arguing that any attempt to articulate a single, unifying theory of free speech risks
oversimplification).
207. Among other goals, the Establishment Clause may also be understood to prevent the
government from interfering with the religious development of its citizens. See infra note 395.
2o8. JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance (1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 295, 11, at 302 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973) (stating that the bill
establishing a provision for teachers of the Christian religion "will destroy that moderation and
harmony which the forbearance of our laws to intermeddle with Religion has produced among
its several sects. Torrents of blood have been spilt in the old world, by vain attempts of the
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the civic divisiveness that follows when the Government weighs in on one
side of religious debate."209
Second, the Establishment Clause protects the religion that is
established from corruption and degradation .2" According to Madison,
"[E]cclesiastical establishments, instead of maintaining the purity and
efficacy of Religion, have had a contrary operation."21I Daniel 0. Conkle
observed that "government 'support' for religion is illusory because it tends
to degrade and cheapen religion."212
Finally, the Establishment Clause protects those who do not belong to
the state-favored religion. As the Supreme Court has noted more than once,
"Another purpose of the Establishment Clause rested upon an awareness of
the historical fact that governmentally established religions and religious
persecutions go hand in hand."213 While establishment of mainstream
religions may reflect indifference rather than hostility toward religious
minorities, that indifference all too easily escalates into intolerance,214 and
what starts merely as preference for some religions invariably bodes ill for
secular arm, to extinguish Religious discord, by proscribing all difference in Religious
opinion.").
209. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 876 (2005); see also Capital Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 812 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Our
Constitution wisely seeks to minimize such strife by forbidding state-endorsed religious
activity.").
210. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589-go (1992) ("It must not be forgotten ...
that while concern must be given to define the protection granted to an objector or a dissenting
nonbeliever, these same Clauses exist to protect religion from government interference."). See
generally Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1831 (2009).
211. MADISON, supra note 2o8, 7, at 301. Madison continued, "During almost fifteen
centuries has the legal establishment of Christianity been on trial. What have been its fruits?
More or less in all places, pride and indolence in the Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity,
in both, superstition, bigotry and persecution." Id.
212. Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REV.
1113, 181 (1988). The Supreme Court has observed, "[R]eligion is too personal, too sacred,
too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 432 (1962) (quoting MADISON, supranote 2o8, 5, at 301); see also id. at 431 ("[A] union
of government and religion tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.").
213. Engel, 370 U.S. at 432, cited in Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 648 n.3 (1989) (Stevens,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 856 (1995)
(Thomas,J., concurring) ("Madison's seventh, ninth, eleventh, and twelfth arguments all speak,
in some way, to the same intolerance, bigotry, unenlightenment, and persecution that had
generally resulted from previous exclusive religious establishments." (quoting ROBERT L. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 21 (1982))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); cf MADISON, supra note 208, 9, at 302 ("Distant as it
may be in its present form from the Inquisition, it differs from it only in degree. The one is the
first step, the other the last in the career of intolerance.").
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those who do not conform.215 Even if the inevitable harm does not rise to
the level of persecution, religious minorities do not escape unscathed.
Protection of religious minorities comports with the Bill of Rights's
general protection of minorities against the tyranny of the majority. As
Justice Jackson famously wrote in striking down mandatory recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's ... fundamental
rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome
of no elections.-
6
Whatever its original intent, the Bill of Rights today is understood as
(and revered for) guaranteeing certain rights to everyone, including
unpopular minorities, even when the majority would rather deprive them of
those rights.217 Furthermore, the unelected judiciary is charged with
ensuring that these rights extend to everyone, even if it means counter-
majoritarian decisions.2 8 After all, if the majority's law violates a guaranteed
right, it should be declared unconstitutional.
Consequently, the Establishment Clause ought to protect atheists and
agnostics in addition to members of minority religions. Nonbelievers are a
minority in their beliefs about religion. The Establishment Clause is meant
to protect those who do not conform to majority religious beliefs-and not
believing in or being uncertain about God clearly fits that description. Since
the goal of the Establishment Clause is to avoid making people's beliefs
about religion a source of harm, it does not matter whether atheism or
agnosticism is itself a religion. In short, "the Establishment Clause requires
the same respect for the atheist as it does for the adherent of a Christian
faith ."29
215. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313,
321 (1996) (noting people's fears that "what starts with mere preference ... will escalate to
discrimination, suppression, or coerced participation in observances of the dominant religion"
and contending that "[t]hese fears gain substance from history.").
216. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
217. Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities and Originalism: Lessons from the Spending Power,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. 495, 510 (2009) ("In addition, the very purpose of many provisions of the
original Constitution, as well as of the Bill of Rights, is to protect minorities from the majority-
to protect the individual from the (majoritarian) government.").
218. See generallyJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980) (arguing for a robust view of the judiciary's role, including the protection of minority
rights); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 528 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
("[T]he independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of
occasional ill humours in the society.").
219. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 711 (2005) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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In fact, even in its early Establishment Clause decisions the Supreme
Court indicated that the Establishment Clause covered nonbelievers.220 In
the case that incorporated the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court
wrote: "No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. '"221 Similarly,
"the Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of
conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select
any religious faith or none at all."222 Recent cases have repeated the Court's
commitment to protecting nonbelievers, and at least in theory, the Court
has not wavered from this promise.223 In practice, however, its Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has fallen short.224 The next two parts will explain
more specifically how the Establishment Clause should be understood so
that it can fulfill this promise of protection for nonbelievers, with Part III
focusing on the Establishment Clause's equality component, and Part IV
focusing on the Establishment Clause's liberty component.
III. THE EQUALITY COMPONENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The debate about equality and the Establishment Clause centers not on
whether it protects the equality of nonbelievers; most courts and
commentators would agree that it should.225 Where opinions differ is in what
way and to what degree the Establishment Clause protects the equality of
220. The Supreme Court, however, has never explicitly held that the Free Exercise Clause
protects nonbelievers to the same extent as believers or that atheism qualifies as a religion. E.g.,
Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 422 F. Supp. 2d ioi6, 1022 (W.D. Wis. 2006) ("The United States
Supreme Court has never determined whether atheism qualifies as a religion."). Compare
Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3 d 678, 682 (7 th Cir. 2005) (noting that under the Wisconsin
administrative code regulating prisons, atheism is a religion for purposes of an inmate's request
for an atheist study group), with Kaufman v. Schneiter, 474 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1027 (W.D. Wis.
2007) (describing an atheist study group as more akin to a secular debate society than to a
group religious practice for purposes of an inmate's request for a study group).
221. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); see also Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) ("We repeat and again affirm that neither a State nor the
Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion."').
222. Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985).
223. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 884 (2005) (O'Connor,J., concurring)
("The Religion Clauses ... protect adherents of all religions, as well as those who believe in no
religion at all."); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590
(1989) ("Perhaps in the early days of the Republic these words were understood to protect only
the diversity within Christianity, but today they are recognized as guaranteeing religious liberty
and equality to 'the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or
Judaism."' (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52)).
224. In its religious-speech cases, for example, the Supreme Court has approved a state-
sponsored Ten Commandments monument, Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681, and prayers before
legislative sessions, Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
225. In other words, few would argue that the government can refuse to hire atheists or ban
atheists from testifying in court without violating the Establishment Clause.
[Vol. 97:347
NONBELIEVERS AND GOVERNMENT SPEECH
atheists. Thus, there is great disagreement about what kinds of government
action unconstitutionally compromise the equality of nonbelievers.2 6 In
resolving this debate, the Establishment Clause can be viewed as essentially
functioning as an Equal Protection Clause for nonbelievers.227 In protecting
the equality of nonbelievers, the Establishment Clause should be understood
as making unconstitutional both expressive harms2s and material harms.229
The Supreme Court has stated on more than one occasion that
government discrimination based on religion triggers heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause.23o Despite this, the Court almost never
relies on the Equal Protection Clause when faced with a religious-
discrimination claim.231 Instead, the issue is decided under the religion
clauses.232 Thus, it falls to the religion clauses to guarantee equal protection
based on religious belief. For example, when the city of Hialeah essentially
outlawed the Santeria religious practice of sacrificing animals but not other
ways of killing animals, the Court turned to the Free Exercise Clause.233 In a
sense, the Free Exercise Clause now operates as an antidiscrimination
provision for state action that targets or hinders a religious practice. In fact,
Hialeah expressly compared the free exercise and equal protection
226. Compare, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHi. L.
REV. 115, 126-27 (1992) (arguing, for example, that the Establishment Clause should not bar
the state from sponsoring religious symbols such as a menorah or a crhche), with Steven B.
Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2124 (1996)
(arguing that most kinds of ceremonial deism should violate the Establishment Clause).
227. Alan E. Brownstein, Harmonizing the Heavenly and Earthly Spheres: The Fragmentation and
Synthesis of Religion, Equality, and Speech in the Constitution, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 89, o3 (1990)
("[T]he establishment clause has become a de facto substitute for an independent equal
protection analysis of the treatment of religious minorities by the state . ).
228. See infra Part III.A (discussing expressivist harms).
229. See infra Part III.B (discussing material harms).
230. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651 (1992) (noting that
classifications based on race or religion are suspect classifications); City of New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (noting that a regulation does not trigger strict scrutiny under
the Equal Protection Clause unless it "trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon
inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage").
231. Perhaps the courts should rely on the Equal Protection Clause. See Susan Gellman &
Susan Looper-Friedman, Thou Shalt Use the Equal Protection Clause for Religion Cases (Not just the
Establishment Clause), 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 665 (2008). Because the case law has traditionally
relied on the religion clauses and the equal protection concern with minorities overlaps with
the traditional Establishment Clause concern for religious minorities, I will frame the issue as
an Establishment Clause question. My arguments about the scope of equal protection apply
with equal force regardless of which clause is applied.
232. Brownstein, supra note 227, at 102-03 (noting that there are few, if any, Supreme
Court cases that explicitly treat religion as a suspect classification under the Equal Protection
Clause).
233. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 5o8 U.S. 520, 532
(1993); see also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (deciding under religion clauses a
challenge to a state ban on theology scholarships when the state allowed all other scholarships).
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analyses.234 When confronting state religious speech like "under God" in the
Pledge or a religious monument, however, it is the Establishment Clause
that comes into play. To start, government religious speech does not directly
impede the free exercise of religion, the province of the Free Exercise
Clause.235 In addition, government religious speech's deleterious effects
stem from the state favoring religion or favoring one religion over others,
which is the concern of the Establishment Clause.23
6
A. EXPRESSIVST HARM TO EQUALITY
How might government religious speech undermine the equality of
nonbelievers? Expressivist theory, which emphasizes "that laws frequently
express certain attitudes, values, or beliefs," has one answer.37 Under
expressivist theory, the harm to equality is caused by the expressive content
of the law or policy at issue.23 8 The focus is on the message conveyed by the
state action rather than its intent s3 or its practical effect.4 ° State action
violates the Constitution's guarantee of equality if its social meaning clashes
with the government's duty to treat each person with equal concern. That is,
234. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 540 ("In determining if the object of a law
is a neutral one under the Free Exercise Clause, we can also find guidance in our equal
protection cases.").
235. As argued in Part IV.B-C, government religious speech does indirectly affect religious
practice by making those outside the favored religion uncomfortable or even afraid to follow
the dictates of their conscience. Therefore, one might argue that government religious speech
does implicate the Free Exercise Clause. However, given the current narrow scope of free
exercise protection, analysis of the Free Exercise Clause would have to change significantly to
encompass this indirect effect. While perhaps it should, the reformulation of Free Exercise
Clause analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.
236. In addition, whether the Free Exercise Clause protections extend to nonbelievers is
subject to debate. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Diverse Perspectives and the Religion Clauses: An
Examination of Justifications and Qualifying Beliefs, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1433, 1473 (1999)
(arguing that claims of conscience will rarely arise directly from atheist or agnostic convictions);
see also supra note 220 (discussing free exercise claims of atheists in prison).
237. Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 669,
682 (2003).
238. Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1533-45 (2000); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive
Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1, 2 (2ooo).
239. Steven D. Smith, Expressivist Jurisprudence and the Depletion of Meaning, 6o MD. L. REV.
5o6, 51o-11 (2001) (arguing that expressivist scholars emphasize social or public meaning over
legislative intent or speaker meaning).
240. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-07
(1993) ("An expressive harm ... results from the ideas or attitudes expressed through a
governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material consequences the action
brings about."); Hellman, supra note 238, at 2. The next part, which addresses how the law
conveys messages that create norms and socialize citizens, could be considered a strand of
expressivism that does consider consequences. Rosen, supra note 237, at 683. For simplicity's
sake, I use the term "expressivism" for the more deontological approach that stresses the
rightness or wrongness of the message rather than the consequences of the message.
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'the government may not express, in words or deeds, that it values some of
us more than others."24, Thus, the constitutional validity of a law depends on
its social or public meaning.242
Dejure segregation is the paradigmatic example of an expressive injury.
The many harms of segregation are well established. Segregation denies
black schoolchildren equal access to education because racially separate
schools are unlikely to be equal in this country. It also sabotages the black
schoolchildren's sense of their own potential and thus undermines their
ability to learn.243 But the expressive harm is the social meaning of
segregation, which is, as we all know, to mark the black race as inferior and
unworthy.244 The crucial point under expressivist theory is that this message
alone violates the Constitution, even apart from any concrete injuries to
identifiable people.245 Thus, as Deborah Hellman argues, legally segregated
daycare centers for infants would violate the Equal Protection Clause, even if
the centers were of equal quality, and even if the babies suffered no
psychological injury, because segregation carries the message of racial
inequality.24
6
Under an expressivist approach, the government violates the
Establishment Clause's equality component if its religious speech fails to
treat believers and nonbelievers with equal concern.247 Again, the injury
turns not on intent or on material harms, but on the state's message of
unequal worth.248 Consequently, the expressive harm of direct financial
support to a church is not in the payment but in what the payment
symbolizes.249
241. Hellman, supra note 238, at 13.
242. Smith, supra note 239, at 519.
243. Hellman, supra note 238, at 9.
244. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 56o (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(explaining that "the real meaning of such legislation" is "that colored citizens are so inferior
and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens"),
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of
the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE LJ. 421, 427 (196o) (arguing that the meaning of segregation
is to put "the Negro in a position of walled-off inferiority").
245. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 238, at 1531; Hellman, supra note 238, at to.
246. Hellman, supra note 238, at lo. Similarly, allowing gay couples to enter into civil
unions with all of the benefits of marriage but still excluding them from marriage itself carries a
message of inequality. See, e.g., Michael C. Doff, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and
Law's Social Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV 1267 (201 1).
247. The expressivist approach to the equality component dovetails well with a structural
approach to the Establishment Clause, as its primary focus is on what the state is empowered to
do, as opposed to how state action affects individuals. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment
Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998). At the same time,
because messages of inequality may perpetuate discrimination, an expressivist approach also
comports with a rights-based approach to the Establishment Clause.
248. See Smith, supra note 239 , at 519.
249. David Cole, Faith and Funding: Toward an Expressivist Model of the Establishment Clause, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 559, 563 (2002).
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The Establishment Clause actually has a longstanding expressivist
tradition. The endorsement test-where the state violates the Establishment
Clause if it endorses religion and "sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members
of the political community"5°--embodies the idea that a message of
unequal value is itself a constitutional harm.251
1. Social Meaning as a Constitutional Injury
Many commentators have questioned whether an act that conveys a
state message of unequal regard, without proof of concrete harm, should
run afoul of the Constitution.5 They argue that the state's action should be
judged based on its consequences: If it has no negative consequences, why
should it be unconstitutional? This is a "no harm, no foul" constitutional
argument. Or, as E. Gregory Wallace puts it, "The endorsement test errs by
leaping from real disabilities to felt disabilities. When government speaks
religiously, 'no one loses the right to vote, the freedom to speak, or any
other state or federal right."'"53 Should a message without more really suffice
to violate the Constitution?
First, it is important to clarify what the expressivist claim is not. It is not
an argument that "offending" someone is unconstitutional.54 Rather, it is an
argument that the state cannot, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause
or the equal protection component of the Establishment Clause, convey the
message that some people are less equal than others or less worthy of regard
because of their race, sex, or religious beliefs. Expressivism argues that it is
of constitutional moment "whether the message sent by a government action
25o. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,688 (1984) (O'Connor,J., concurring).
251. Kenneth L. Karst, Justice O'Connor and the Substance of Equal Citizenship, 2003 SUP. CT.
REV. 357, 368 (noting thatJustice O'Connor's endorsement test, with its "concern for dignitary
harms bears a strong family resemblance to the concerns of modern equal protection doctrine
as applied to discrimination against 'outsiders' in other categories of self-identity, such as race
or sex or sexual orientation").
252. E.g., Smith, supra note 239, at 519-20 (describing as counterintuitive a theory that
determines constitutionality based on message and not consequences); cf Matthew D. Adler,
Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1444-47 (2000).
253. E. Gregory Wallace, When Government Speaks Religiously, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1183,
1222 (1994) (quoting Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the 'No Endorsement' Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 307 (1987)).
254. Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, i8J.L. & POL. 499, 521
(2002) ("[A]bsent any meaningful threat to religious liberty, distressed sensibilities should not
rise to the level of a judicially cognizable harm under the Establishment Clause ...."); cf., e.g.,
William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 66
IND. L.J. 351, 364 (1991).
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comports with the underlying values embodied in the constitutional
provision at issue."'55
Some scholars argue that current equal protection jurisprudence has
rejected (correctly, in their view) an expressivist approach for discrimination
based on race, and therefore, it would be inappropriate to adopt it for
discrimination based on religion.25 6 In support they cite Palmer v. Thompson,
where the town of Jackson, Mississippi, closed all its public pools
immediately after a desegregation order.257 The Supreme Court rejected an
Equal Protection Clause claim on the ground that blacks and whites were
equally deprived of public swimming pools.258 Many have interpreted this
case to stand for the proposition that there can be no equal protection
violation without some sort of material or tangible harm to the affected
group (and to them alone).259
A closer reading, however, reveals that the Court's argument was that a
discriminatory motivation without more could not suffice26o for the usual
reasons why intent-based determinations are considered problematic, such
as the fact that the motive of a group of legislators is impossible to
ascertain, 26 , or that the same law could be passed without the improper
motive. 262 This holding arguably does not exclude an expressivist approach
because under expressivism what matters is not the motivation behind
legislation, but the social meaning of the legislation.263
Furthermore, other cases do support an expressivist understanding of
equal protection. Brown itself is the most famous example2 64 In addition, in
Strauder v. West Virginia, the Court struck down a law excluding blacks from
the jury pool, writing that the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens
255. Rachel D. Godsil, Expressivism, Empathy and Equality, 36 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 247, 249
(2003).
256. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 254, at 364 (arguing that there are two necessary
components for an equal protection violation: (I) "the classification ... must be pejorative of
the group claiming stigmatic injury," and (2) "there must be a harm in addition to the ...
stigma").
257. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 219 (1971); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
755 (1984) (denying standing to African-American parents who claimed that the state's failure
to enforce antidiscrimination laws against private schools stigmatized them).
258. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 220 ("[T]his is not a case where whites are permitted to use public
facilities while blacks are denied access.").
259. See, e.g., Godsil, supra note 255, at 261-62 (noting that Palmer represents an
abandonment of a stigmatic- or expressive-harm test in favor of one that focused on intent).
26o. Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224 ("[N]o case in this Court has held that a legislative act may
violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it.").
261. Id.
262. Id. at 22 5 .
263. Moreover, social meaning does not depend on discerning the thoughts of individual
legislators, nor is repassing a law likely to change it. Granted, motive can inform the social
meaning, but it is not determinative.
264. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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because of their race "is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law,
an assertion of their inferiority."265 Of course, these cases preceded Palmer
and also involved material harms. Nonetheless, following Palmer, the Court
has on more than one occasion decided equal protection cases based upon
the message sent by the state. For example, in Shaw v. Reno,266 the Supreme
Court held that North Carolina's redistricting violated equal protection
because a bizarrely shaped district, the result of racial gerrymandering, sent
pernicious messages about race: "Classifications of citizens solely on the basis
of race ... threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership
in a racial group and to incite racial hostility."267 Similarly, in Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan, the Court held that a women-only state
nursing school violated equal protection in large part because it
communicated a message fraught with "archaic and stereotypic[al]
notions' 268 and "traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper
roles of men and women. 
" 2 69
Setting aside the descriptive question of whether controlling, equal
protection decisions support an expressivist approach to equality, the
normative question remains as to whether such an approach should be
adopted. In other words, even assuming Palmer rejected an expressivist
approach, perhaps it ought to be considered wrongly decided. Perhaps
there should have been an Equal Protection Clause violation for the state to
close the pools, because, as the dissent pointed out, "The fact is that closing
the pools is an expression of official policy that Negroes are unfit to
associate with whites.... The Equal Protection Clause is a hollow promise if
it does not forbid such official denigrations of the race the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to protect."270 To the extent that the
265. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 3o8 (1879), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana,
4 19 U.S. 522 (1975).
266. Both Hellman, supra note 238, at 26-27, and Pildes & Niemi, supra note 24o, at 508-
o9, point to Shaw as an example of an equal protection decision based on the social message of
state action.
267. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993). In addition, "[ilt reinforces the perception
that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, economic status, or
the community in which they live-think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer
the same candidates at the polls." Id. at 647. Whether perpetuating this perception is equivalent
to perpetuating other destructive stereotypes about blacks, as Justice O'Connor concluded, is a
separate question.
268. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
269. Id. at 726; see also id. at 729-30 ("MUYW's policy of excluding males from admission to
the School of Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively
woman's job. ... MUW's admissions policy lends credibility to the old view that women, not
men, should become nurses, and makes the assumption that nursing is a field for women a self-
fulfilling prophecy." (citations omitted)).
270. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 240-41 (1971) (White, J., dissenting). The
dissent went on to say, "[Bly closing the pools solely because of the order to desegregate, the
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Establishment Clause might provide greater protection than the Equal
Protection Clause, it is equal protection that should be expanded, not the
Establishment Clause that should be retracted.
2. Determination of Social Meaning
Another critique of the expressivist approach is that social meaning is
elusive. Steven Smith argues that as difficult as it is to determine the intent
behind a law, it is even harder to determine its social meaning.271 Although
intent depends on the motives of a body of legislators, social meaning
depends on the interpretation of everyone else.272 Yet the alternatives to
using social meaning as a constitutional yardstick-intent or
consequences-are not necessarily more definite. Motive may depend on
the internal psychology of individual lawmakers, which is not publicly
available. Social meaning, by definition, does not depend on any such inside
knowledge. Instead it depends on understanding what message a law or
other state action conveys given "its text, history, and implementation in the
context of American culture."273 And unless one adopts the narrowest
definition of consequences, a court usually will not have all the empirical
evidence it needs to fully determine the consequences of a law. In fact, of
the three, it may well be that determining social meaning is more within the
court's institutional competence than uncovering motive or calculating
effects.274
Nonetheless, pinpointing social meaning can be a challenge, especially
if people cannot agree on a shared social meaning, as can happen with
government religious speech.275 In particular, people disagree about
whether government speech favorable to religion communicates any
city is expressing its official view that Negroes are so inferior that they are unfit to share with
whites this particular type of public facility.... ." Id. at 266.
271. SeeSmith, supra note 239, at 542.
272. See id.
273. Jerry Kang, Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability of Dworkin's
Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 1, 25 (1996).
274. Smith, supra note 239, at 547. My claim is not that courts are incapable of doing either
of these analyses; rather, my claim is that a social-meaning analysis is not necessarily more
difficult.
275. Split decisions on religious displays result in part from the different social meanings
attributed to the display. For example, the majority in Van Orden v. Perry held that the Ten
Commandments monument merely acknowledged the role of religion in our Nation's heritage.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 688-89 (2005). The dissent found that they represented a
sacred religious text declaring God's divinity. Id. at 7o7-o8, 717 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The
majority in Newdow v. Rio Linda Union School District held that the Pledge of Allegiance was a
patriotic exercise designed to foster love of country. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597
F.3 d 1007, loi8 (9th Cir. 20O). However, the dissent argued that Congress added "under




message of inequality or whether government speech with religious content
even conveys any message about religion at all.
a. Messages of Inequality?
Unlike segregation, whose message of inferiority and superiority is
unmistakable, the social meaning of much government religious speech is
less obvious, rendering conclusions that the government is marking
nonbelievers as unequal members of society more contestable. Of course,
sometimes the social meaning may be easy to discern: a government
advertisement campaign about the impossibility of teaching morality without
religion clearly conveys a message of disparate value between faith and no
faith.
However, most government religious speech does not so obviously
denigrate nonbelief. Instead, government religious speech usually takes the
form of support for religion with no explicit statement about nonbelief, such
as the state sponsoring a Latin cross war memorial or including God in the
national Pledge and motto. In fact, virtually all Establishment Clause
challenges to government religious speech in the United States involve the
government favoring the Judeo-Christian religious tradition. Does this
speech create a hierarchy between religion and nonreligion?276 Does it, like
segregation, send a message of inequality?
Supporting one thing does not necessarily mean disparaging something
else. Making the piano the state's official musical instrument does not cast
cello fans as outsiders or less valuable members of the community. At the
same time, supporting something can implicitly convey a message of
denigration or at least inequality.77 Imagine, for example, that a state
declared that the official state race was the white race. The question, then, is
whether making Judeo-Christianity the favorite state religious tradition is
more like picking a favorite musical instrument or more like picking a
favorite race.278
276. Notably, the state's message about religious minorities need not be denigrating to be
problematic under the Establishment Clause. There are several different ways a state may
express a preference for one religion over others. It may show active hostility toward the
nonfavored religions. However, its message may also be that the state prefers this religion, and
by implication, all other religions are less worthy. Alternately, it might convey the message that
other beliefs are acceptable or even good, but that the favored one is nonetheless superior. All
would be unconstitutional under the equality component of the Establishment Clause, which
bars any favoritism.
277. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 254, at 365 ("A favorable statement about one class is not
necessarily a correlative pejorative remark about another.").
278. Cf EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 12, at 124-25 (comparing, hypothetically, a
"Fineville-A Christian Community" sign to a "Fineville-A Nuclear-Free Community" sign).
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An official state religion is more akin to an official state race. 279 One of
the reasons why religious beliefs, even if not truly immutable s28 are
considered a protected characteristic under the Equal Protection Clause is
that they are deeply constitutive of identity, like race or sex. s , Consequently,
a state proclaiming that it favors this race or this religion is essentially stating
that people of this race, or people of this religion, are favored. Even if the
state is not denigrating anyone, it is announcing its preference for one
group over others.282 Such a message clearly clashes with the State's
obligation to "not express, in words or deeds, that it values some of us more
than others."28s
Furthermore, in determining the social meaning of government
religious speech, the government's statement cannot be isolated from its
historical and cultural context. To the contrary, social meaning is dependent
on context.s4 Another reason race, sex, and religion are protected is that
people have been subordinated and discriminated against based on those
characteristics.2S5 Given the United States' long history of oppressing blacks
279. Id. at 124-28 (arguing that the social meaning of government support for religion is
disparagement of those who do not belong to that religion).
28o. Religion is not immutable in the way that race and sex are (although these too are not
entirely immutable). On the other hand, nor is religion mutable in the way that political beliefs
are either; for many they are deeply rooted and extremely difficult to alter. Timothy L. Hall,
Religion, Equality, and Difference, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 62 (1992) (arguing that religion works as a
suspect classification in part because "[rieligious convictions frequently appear to their
possessors as immutable: something they did not choose, but which chose them"). Studies show
that the majority of people identify with the religion they learned as a child. See, e.g., PEW
FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, FAITH IN FLUX 2-3 (2009), available at http://pewforum.org/
uploadedfiles/Topics/Religious Affiliation/fullreport.pdf (finding that nearly three-quarters of
adults belong to the religion of their childhood, with over half of adults belonging to the same
denomination).
281. See, e.g., John E. Thompson, What's the Big Deal? The Unconstitutionality of God in the
Pledge of Allegiance, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 563, 597 (2003) (arguing that "religion [is] often
crucial to self-identity, for believers and non-believers alike"); Tseming Yang, Race, Religion, and
Cultural Identity: Reconciling the Jurisprudence of Race and Religion, 73 IND. L.J. 1 19, 121 (1997)
(arguing that race and religion play similar roles in self-identity).
282. Notably, state endorsements of Christianity particularly lend themselves to the
negative inference that favoring religion includes disfavoring other belief systems. If the favored
religion were pluralistic and did not view other religions as wrong, it might pose less of an issue
for the state to prefer it. However, certain teachings within Christian traditions repudiate other
faiths and condemn those who do not accept their beliefs. Thus while the government itself
may not directly denigrate those outside these traditions, it does so indirectly by approving and
sponsoring those who do. See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 227, at 148-49 (celebrating various
ethnicities is possible because "[e] thnic self-esteem is not a zero sum game, religious truth is").
283. Hellman, supra note 238, at 13.
284. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 240, at 507-08 (stating that when courts recognize
expressive harms, they are interpreting "the expressive significance or social meaning that a
particular governmental action has in the specific historical, political, and social context in
which it takes place").
285. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Religion and Race Under the Constitution: Similarities and
Differences, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 491, 491-93 (1994) (arguing that a history of hostility and hate
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and the continuing discrimination they still confront, it cannot be credibly
argued that no negative inference about blacks should be drawn from a
declaration that whites are the official state race. Similarly, the social
meaning of a pro-religion statement must take into account the prejudice
that nonbelievers have in the past and still today face.286 1 do not mean to say
that discrimination against atheists in the United States has taken the same
form as discrimination against blacks in the United States. It obviously has
not. But they need not be equivalent in order to understand that the
backdrop of prejudice and hostility against nonbelievers complicates
statements made in favor of religion.
b. Religious Messages at All?
Of course, government religious speech generally does not take the
form of declaring an official state religion; indeed, in many cases, whether
the government is sending any message about religion is the central
dispute.28 7 The cross designated as a national war memorial in Mojave
National Preserve provides a recent example.28 8 That cross is the only
national monument honoring World War I veterans.2S9 As is often the case
with goverr ment religious speech, the competing visions of social meaning
come down to a clash between those whose religion is favored-who focus
on the nonreligious import-and those whose religion or nonreligion is
not-who focus on the religious implications of government religious
speech. Thus, Christians and Christian groups tended to argue that the
message of the war memorial was simply to honor veterans of World War
1.29o Non-Christian groups, on the other hand, argued for a social meaning
that involved the government favoring and honoring Christianity.291
toward religious beliefs and race provides a strong justification for strict scrutiny of government
discrimination based upon either).
286. Atheists are also uniquely ill-positioned to protect themselves in the political process,
given how strong anti-atheist bias is in the political arena. See supra notes 138-44 and
accompanying text. Atheists, therefore, do not get elected, and few non-atheist politicians stand
up for them.
287. See infra note 293; see also Pildes & Neimi, supra note 240, at 507-08.
288. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811-13 (2010).
289. In other words, it is the only monument honoring WWI veterans that has been
designated a national landmark. Brief forJewish War Veterans of the United States of America,
Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4, Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (No. o8-472), 2009
WL 24o6367.
290. See, e.g., Brief of the Thomas More Law Center et al. as Arnici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 16, Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (No. 08-472), 2009 WL 1629704 ("[Al reasonable
observer would know that while the cross is a religious symbol, it is also a universal symbol of
self-sacrifice-and in the context of a war veterans' memorial, the cross is a symbol of the
ultimate sacrifice made for one's country.").
291. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Freedom from Religion Foundation in Support of
Respondent at 9, Salazar, 130 S. Ct. 18o 3 (No. 08-472), 2009 WL 24o6366 ("No secular
[Vol- 97:347
NONBELIEVERS AND GOVERNMENT SPEECH
When faced with competing understandings, there are two possible
ways to resolve the question. One is to decide which is more plausible. Social
meaning is determined by the text, implementation, history, and specific
social context.2 92 Not every claimed interpretation is consistent with these.293
It was not really credible to argue that segregation in the 1950s carried no
message of subordination, no matter how many white people insisted
otherwise. In resolving its government religious speech cases, the Supreme
Court too often adopts the perspective of the privileged majority.94 Yet, in
most Establishment Clause challenges, the more persuasive social meaning is
the plausible meaning as understood by the nonfavored group,95 as this is
usually the meaning that better accounts for the historical and social
context. Privileged groups tend to be blind to the way their privilege
operates.29 6 Consequently, privileged groups often do not understand that
their experience is not the universal experience and they miss the power
dynamics that inform the social meaning of the state's action.297 How else to
explain how whites could conclude that segregation only maligned blacks if
blacks chose to put that construction on it,298 or that segregation presented
an unsolvable clash between the freedom of association of whites and the
freedom of association of blacks?299
The same blindness underlies the claim that a state cross does not favor
Christianity because it is a universal marker for death. To be clear, choosing
a Latin cross to serve as a war memorial is not the same as declaring
Christianity the official state religion. Yet it still conveys a preference for
Christianity and a message of unequal value.oo A cross may seem like a
purpose, no matter how sincere, will detract from the overall message that the Latin cross
stands for Christianity and the overall display promotes Christianity.").
292. It may also be informed by intent.
293. This may be because the claim is a sham. Or it may be, as discussed below, because
privilege distorts the analysis.
294. Thus, while the endorsement test could be a vehicle for a successful expressivist
approach to the Establishment Clause, in application it usually falls short.
295. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider,
57 UCLA L. REV. 1545 (2010). Of course, the nonfavored group's understanding must be
plausible. It is reasonable for an American nonbeliever to view a cross or a crbche as a
preference for Christianity. On the other hand, a reasonable nonbeliever would not view Earth
Day in the United States as an endorsement of Gaia/Earth Goddess worship.
296. Id. at 1592-97.
297. Id. at 1585-92.
298. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) ("We consider the underlying fallacy of
the plaintiffs argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of
anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it."), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
299. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959).
3oo. The recent Supreme Court case Salazar v. Buono, which involved a Latin cross
monument in the Mojave National Preserve, never actually reached this question. Instead, it
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universal symbol of death to American Christians because (a) it represents
death to them; (b) as members of the dominant religion, they may have
never learned the symbols that other religions do or do not use;30' and (c)
members of dominant groups tend to universalize their subjective
experience.30 2 Nonetheless, the Latin cross is a uniquely Christian symbol. It
"represents with relative clarity and simplicity the Christian message of the
crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ."3o3 The Supreme Court itself
has acknowledged the religiosity of the symbol.304 The claim that the Latin
cross is a universal marker of the dead is simply inaccurate. "If the cross
signifies death, it is because for Christians (but only for Christians), the cross
evokes Christ's death, resurrection, and promise of everlasting life."3o5
Consequently, Christians alone use it to mark graves.o 6 The U.S. armed
forces have not made this error. They permit family members of veterans to
choose one of thirty-nine "emblems of belief' for their headstones.o7 And
held that a transfer of state-park land to private parties did not violate the lower court's
injunction barring the state from displaying a Latin cross on public property. Salazar v. Buono,
130 S. Ct. 1803, 1816-17 (2010). In finding unconstitutional a Latin cross war memorial atop
Mount Soledad, however, the Ninth Circuit held that "[t] he use of such a distinctively Christian
symbol to honor all veterans ... suggests that the government is so connected to a particular
religion that it treats that religion's symbolism as its own, as universal." Trunk v. City of San
Diego, 629 F.3 d 1099, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2011).
301. Cf PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUs KNOWLEDGE SURVEY 6-7
(2010) (noting that a questionnaire on religious knowledge showed that Jews, atheists, and
agnostics had the most knowledge of world religions). Ajew in the United States for example,
aware of majority traditions, is not likely to claim that the Star of David is a universal symbol of
death.
302. In other words, the dominant group will present its subjective view and experience as
the objective universal one, and if the judges belong to the same dominant group, they may well
validate this claim.
303. Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1525 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Okrand v. City
of Los Angeles, 254 Cal. Rptr. 913, 922 (Ct. App. 1989)).
304. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 661
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he
[Establishment] Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on
the roof of city hall.").
305. Brief for Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America, Inc. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent, supra note 289, at 7; see also id. ("If honoring sacrifice is a meaning of
the cross, it is because for Christians (but only for Christians), the cross symbolizes Christ's
sacrifice for humankind's sins.").
3o6. See, e.g., Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3 d 1145, 1162 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding
that state roadside crosses commemorating the deaths of highway patrol members were
predominately religious symbols in part because "there is no evidence in this case that the cross
has been widely embraced by non-Christians as a secular symbol of death"), amended and
superseded sub nom. Am. Atheist, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3 d 1095 (1oth Cir. 2010).
307. Options include the Buddhist Wheel of Righteousness, the Jewish Star of David, the
Bahai Nine Pointed Star, the Muslim Crescent and Star, the Sikh Khanda, and the Wicca
Pentacle. Available Emblems of Belieffor Placement on Government Headstones and Markers, U.S. DEP'T
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.cem.va.gov/hm/hmemb.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
[Vol. 97:347
NONBELIEVERS AND GOVERNMENT SPEECH
indeed, "the vast majority of war memorials in the United States do not
include crosses."308
It is conceivable that some government displays or symbols may be
susceptible of two equally plausible interpretations, though the ones in
Establishment Clause challenges rarely are. In such instances, the one with
religious import should control the Establishment Clause analysis. The same
approach would apply for determining social meaning in equal protection
cases. Imagine, for example, an equal protection challenge to a state flying a
confederate flag. Some might argue that the confederate flag represents
pride in Southern heritage; others that it embodies nostalgia for the
subordination of blacks. The first question would be whether these are really
equally persuasive readings of the use of the confederate flag in Southern
states. Assuming that they are,30 9 then the plausible meaning inflected by
race-i.e., that the flag represents white supremacy-is the one that should
control for the equal protection analysis. Some might protest that this means
a state could not celebrate its history with a historical flag. This is true.
However, one of the consequences of having the enslavement of a people in
your history is that you cannot celebrate that history any way you wish.
Likewise, one of the consequences of having a history where one religion is
privileged over all others is that you cannot celebrate it any way you wish.31°
Importantly, this approach does not preclude celebrating America's
religious history with a museum exhibit, a history class, a clearly worded
proclamation, or some other way where the historical or secular import
unquestionably dominates.3"
However, the Latin cross is not a symbol open to equally plausible
interpretations. Consequently, to demand that a Christian symbol be
Nonbelievers also have options, including the Humanist Emblem of Spirit and the Atheist Atom
Symbol. Id.
3o8. Trunk v. City of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1o99, 1112 (9th Cir. 2011). While American
soldiers who died during World War I and World War II are memorialized with crosses in
Europe and the Pacific, these crosses mark the individual graves of Christian soldiers. Id. at
1113. Jewish soldiers, on the other hand, are honored with Stars of David. Id. Meanwhile,
American military graves use rectangular tombstones engraved with one of the emblems of
belief described above. Id.
3o9. This assumption can be rebutted, as states adopted the confederate flag in reaction to
desegregation. For example, Georgia changed its state flag to incorporate the confederate flag
in 1956, Georgia Military Forces Reorganization Act of 1955, No. 29, sec. 1, § 90, 1956 Ga.
Laws 38, 39, and South Carolina starting flying the confederate flag instead of its state flag on
its state capitol dome in 1962, David Firestone, South Carolina Votes to Remove Confederate Flag
from Dome, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2ooo/o5/s9/us/south-
carolina-votes-to-remove-confederate-flag-from-dome.html.
31o. Again, I do not mean to equate these histories. See supra note 276 and accompanying
text. Rather, the point is that a state must exercise care when celebrating a history whose
practices would today be condemned,
311. See infra notes 415-18 and accompanying text (describing some permissible
government speech about religion).
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accepted as a universal symbol of respect for the dead is akin to expecting
that a United Nations delegation accept the American flag as a universal
symbol of patriotism. In short, for the government to insist on a Latin cross
as a war memorial, especially over the protests of people from many
different faiths, not only fails to treat nonbelievers with equal regard but also
fails to treat members of all other religious traditions with equal regard.
B. MATERIAL HARM TO EQUALITY
In addition to expressive harm, government religious speech causes
material harm. Indeed, it is unrealistic to think that government messages
about one group's inferiority or lesser value have no concrete effects.312 It
may not cause the obvious harms described by Wallace,3'3 but at the very
least, government religious speech reinforces the stereotypes about atheists
that drive harmful discrimination in the first place.
1. Perpetuating Discrimination
The expressive harm is not the only harm to equality caused by
government religious speech. As far back as Strauder the Supreme Court
recognized that the state's message of inferiority is not just wrong in itself
but has the negative consequence of reinforcing stereotypes that deprive the
stigmatized group of equality. There, the Court noted:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly
denied by a statute ... is practically a brand upon them, ... an
assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice
which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that
equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.3'4
When the government speaks, it simultaneously reflects and "helps
shape social power and norms by prefiguring preferences, prejudices, and
interests."3'5 Instead of refuting stereotypes about nonbelievers, the
government's religious speech reaffirms them.3' 6 Stereotypes can operate at
312. See Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the Politics of Religion and the Symbols of
Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 511 (1992) (suggesting that government
endorsement of religion reinforces dominant and subordinate positions of religious groups);
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024-25 (1996)
(describing how legal statements help shape social norms).
313. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
314. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 3o8 (1879), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975).
315. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse and the
Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1333 (2000); see also Danielle Keats
Citron, Law's Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender Harassment, 1o8 MICH. L. REV. 373, 407
(2009) ("Because law creates and shapes social mores, it has an important cultural impact
... ."); Sunstein, supra note 312, at 2026 ("[B]eliefs[] are not a presocial given but a product of
a complex set of social forces, possibly including law." (footnotes omitted)).
3 16. See Thomas Healy, Stigmatic Harm and Standing, 92 IOWA L. REV. 417,451-52 (2007).
[Vol. 97:347
NONBELIEVERS AND GOVERNMENT SPEECH
both the conscious and unconscious level. If a person in charge of hiring
kindergarten teachers believes the stereotype that atheists are immoral, she
may consciously decide against hiring a nonbeliever.3'7 Stereotypes also
influence people's cognitive processes on an unconscious level.3', Thus,
social science has found that stereotypes can distort decisionmaking by, for
example, leading people to assess,3'9 value32°  notice, and recall
information*, in a way that conforms to pre-existing notions.322
As discussed above, atheists are often viewed as immoral and
unpatriotic. These stereotypes mean atheists risk discrimination in every
facet of life.3sl An open atheist in the United States likely cannot get elected
to political office.324 Though public opinion polls focus on the Presidency
317. Gervais, supra note 13, at 22, 28 (quoting a study that showed that participants rating
high belief in God were less likely to hire an atheist for ajob requiring a trustworthy candidate,
such as daycare workers or kindergarten teachers); see also supra notes 98-99 and accompanying
text (summarizing public-opinion polls showing that many Americans thought atheists should
not be schoolteachers).
318. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1 161, 1214 (1995); Linda
Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit
Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1032-33 (2oo6).
319. Behavior is interpreted differently if performed by a white person rather than a black
person or a man rather than a woman. Thus, for example, "[r]sum6s are evaluated more
favorably when they carry male rather than female names." Deborah L. Rhode, The Subtle Side of
Sexism, 16 COLUM.J. GENDER & L. 613, 618 (2007) (citing Rhea E. Steinpreis et al., The Impact of
Gender on the Review of Curricula Vitae ofJob Applicants and Tenure Candidates: A National Empirical
Study, 41 SEX ROLES 509 (1999)).
32o. The criteria deemed the most important for ajob can shift depending on the gender
of the person possessing them. Thus, in one study, education was considered a more important
qualification than job experience when the male candidates had stronger educational
backgrounds and female candidates had stronger employment histories; in constrast, job
experience was considered more important when the reverse was true. Krieger & Fiske, supra
note 318, at 1037.
321. People are more likely to notice and recall information that confirms their existing
stereotypes. Rhode, supra note 319, at 624 ("[Wjhen employers assume that a working mother
is unlikely to be fully committed to her career, they more easily remember the times when she
left early than the times when she stayed late. Similarly, attorneys who assume that women of
color are beneficiaries of preferential treatment, not merit-based selection, will recall their
errors more readily than their merits.").
322. Krieger & Fiske, supra note 318, at 1032-33 ("[S]tereotypes can function as implicit,
associative networks that subconsciously predispose the stereotype holder to perceive,
characterize, and behave toward a stereotyped target in stereotype-consistent ways.").
323. Healy, supra note 316, at 453-54 (noting that members of stigmatized groups always
face the possibility of discrimination in employment, education, housing, and relationships).
324. Steven G. Gey, Rewriting the Establishment Clause for One Nation Under (a) God, 41 TULSA
L. REV. 737, 757 (2006) ("In most parts of the country, an avowed atheist or agnostic who has
the bad judgment to announce that fact will have no chance of winning a political contest."). As
with all rules, however, there may be exceptions. For example, Congressman Fortney Hillman
"Pete" Stark, Jr., who had served since 1973 as a Democrat from California, was re-elected in
2008 despite having confirmed in 2007 that he was a Unitarian who did not believe in a
supreme being. Carla Marinucci, Stark's Atheist Views Break Political Taboo, SFGATE.coM (Mar.
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and other national offices, atheists may find themselves shut out of countless
local positions, as people are also elected to school boards, zoning
committees, town councils, district attorney's offices, judgeships, and
sheriffs departments. Nonbelievers may also find their educational
opportunities and employment prospects impeded if they are open about
their religious beliefs.325 The personal lives of atheists are also affected by
prejudice, whether in custody battles for their children or relations with the
in-laws. Government religious speech that equates religious adherence with
morality and patriotism exacerbates these harms by reinforcing negative
stereotypes of atheists.32
6
The government's religious speech not only perpetuates these
stereotypes but also makes it more difficult for nonbelievers to overcome
them.327 Social science has shown that one of the best ways to break down
stereotypes is for people to interact with members of the stigmatized
group328: "Stereotypes weaken as people observe nonstereotypical behavior
in minorities they come to know, and prejudices weaken as people
cooperate with minorities in win-win projects."329 The government's
religious speech, however, makes it more likely that atheists stay in the
closet.so As a result, instead of stereotype-busting interaction, the
stereotypes and discrimination persist.
2. Attributing Discrimination to the State
One might counter that, aside from custody decisions, the harms in
government religious speech cases are perpetuated by private individuals,
not the State. In Habecker, for example, the Tenth Circuit held that the
former Town Trustee lacked standing to challenge the town's pledge policy
because his injury-being recalled from office-was caused by private
14, 2007), http://articles.sfgate.cOm/2007-03-1 4/news/7235967.1_atheist-secular-coalition-
political-suicide.
325. See supra note 317. People seem especially uncomfortable with atheists in positions of
trust. Gey, supra note 324.
326. See infra Part III.B. 3 (describing how government religious speech reinforces
stereotypes of atheists as immoral and unpatriotic).
327. See infra Part III.B. 3 .
328. This method is known as the social-contact hypothesis. Gervais, supra note 13, at 34.
See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (2 5 th anniv. ed. 1979)
(explaining the benefits of increased social contact between groups as a means to assuage the
negative effects of discrimination).
329. Eskridge, supra note 315, at 141o; see also Gervais, supra note 13. In his study, Gervais
found that while believers were less likely to hire atheists for positions of trust, merely reading
information about the large number of nonbelievers reduced the amount of bias. Gervais, supra
note 13, at 33-34. The study hypothesized that the excerpt may have forced a sort of
retrospective contact with atheists: "We did not actually bring religious participants into
cooperative contact with atheists; we simply reminded them that they do this all the time by
themselves." Id. at 34.
330. See infra Part IV.C.
[Vol. 97:347
NONBELIEVERS AND GOVERNMENT SPEECH
individuals, not the State.33, Although the recall may have been precipitated
by the town's pledge policy, the electorate's actions broke the chain of
causation.33
2
Yet the state should not automatically be off the constitutional hookjust
because it was not the immediate direct cause. Establishment Clause claims
are often brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,333 and the Supreme Court
has directed courts to look to tort law in determining state responsibility for
constitutional violations in § 1983 actions.34 Under tort law, a tortfeasor is
responsible for an injury if its conduct was the actual and proximate cause of
that harm.335 Both are satisfied in Habecker. The State actually caused
Habecker's harm because, but for the pledge policy, Habecker's religious
views would not have been disclosed and Habecker would not have been
recalled.336 The State's policy was also the proximate cause because the
electorate's reaction to Habecker's disclosure was foreseeable,337 and
intervening acts of third parties do not relieve a defendant of liability for its
own conduct if the intervening cause itself was foreseeable.338 So, for
example, the state can be liable for an inmate's beating even if other
prisoners were the ones who actually administered it, so long as the beating
331. Habeckerv. Town of Estes Park, 518 F.3 d 1217, 1224-25 (oth Cir. 2o08).
332. Id. at 1224-26.
333. Congress enacted § 1983 to "create[] a right of action in Federal court against local
government officials who deprive citizens of their constitutional rights by failing to enforce the
law, or by unfair and unequal enforcement." H.R. REP. No. 96-548, at 1 (1979), reprinted in
1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 26o9, 26o9. Recent Establishment Clause cases brought pursuant to § 1983
include: McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677 (2005); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
334. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 n.7 (1986) ("[Section] 1983 'should be
read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions.'" (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961))).
335. Actual harm is generally understood as addressing the empirical question of whether
the defendant caused the harm, while proximate cause is understood as addressing "the
normative issue of the proper extent of legal responsibility." See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Once
More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND.
L. REv. 1071, 1073 (2001 ) (criticizing the Restatement's treatment of legal cause).
336. Habecker had served as a town trustee intermittently over a twenty-year period before
the pledge policy outed him as a nonbeliever. Habecker v. Town of Estes Park, 452 F. Supp. 2d
1113, 1116 (D. Colo. 2oo6), affd, 518 F. 3 d 1217 (loth Cir. 2oo8).
337. See Limone v. United States, 579 F. 3 d 79, 1oo (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that the FBI
may be liable under § 1983 for failing to turn over exculpatory evidence even though the state's
decision to prosecute and the jury's decision to convict were intervening acts because those
intervening acts were foreseeable consequences); Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3 d 93, 127
(2d Cir. 2004) ("The fact that the intervening third party may exercise independent judgment
... does not.., relieve the defendant of responsibility.").
338. Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3 d 31, 51 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Powers v. Hamilton
Cnty. Pub. Defender Comm'n, 501 F. 3 d 592, 6og (6th Cir. 2007) ("Even if an intervening third
party is the immediate trigger for the plaintiff's injury, the defendant may still be proximately
liable [under § 1983], provided that the third party's actions were foreseeable.").
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was a foreseeable consequence of the state's conduct.339 Consequently,
Habecker's unseating should be attributable to the State for Establishment
Clause purposes.34o
In Habecker, the government's pledge policy both outed an atheist and
reinforced negative stereotypes about atheists. What if the harm is just the
latter? What if an openly atheist candidate running for office wants the state
to take down its "don't-vote-for-atheists-because-they-are-immoral" sign on
the grounds that it will hurt her chances?34' In that scenario, the problem
may not be satisfying proximate cause, since it is foreseeable that stereotypes
will lead to discrimination,4V but rather satisfying cause in fact. In other
words, if the atheist politician loses because of stereotypes, is it possible to
measure the extent of the government's contribution to dissemination of
those stereotypes? Or, alternatively, given an electorate already hostile to
atheists, is the state's contribution to the plaintiff's loss too minimal to be
considered an actual cause of the resulting harm?
The easier question to answer is whether one of many contributors to a
harm should be considered responsible for it, even if its exact contribution
cannot be determined. Again, tort law provides helpful analogies. If a factory
is one of ten factories that dumps toxins in a river, should it be considered a
cause of the river's polluting? The answer surely is yes,343 insofar as the
plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. While the inability to measure the state's
precise contribution may preclude plaintiffs from seeking damages, most
Establishment Clause plaintiffs are more concerned with stopping the
religious speech.344
339. Palay v. United States, 349 F.3 d 418 (7th Cir. 2003) (reversing a dismissal in a § 1983
suit for damages from gang violence that was considered a foreseeable consequence of
transferring prisoner).
340. Cf Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 451, 472
(1995) (arguing that the school's policy of requiring the Pledge should be considered a
proximate cause of pressuring students to participate, even if peer pressure is the immediate
direct cause).
341. In this hypothetical, I am assuming people did not vote for her because she was an
atheist.
342. Since this is so well known, it is obviously foreseeable that advancing these stereotypes
would lead to discrimination. Notably, under tort law it is the general type of harm, not the
actual injury suffered, that must be foreseeable. Palay, 349 F.3 d at 434 ("[S]o long as the
defendant could have foreseen that his negligence would result in some type of injury, the
precise nature or method of injury need not have been foreseeable.").
343. Cf Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523-25 (2007) (stating that to have standing
to sue the EPA to regulate vehicle emissions, it was enough for Massachusetts to show that the
EPA's failure to regulate contributed to the Commonwealth's global-warming injuries); Frank
H. Easterbrook, Foreword, The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40 (1984)
("Someone who feeds me a poison that increases my chances of dying next year has injured me,
even if I am neither dead nor sure to die .... ").
344. Patrick M. Garry, A Congressional Attempt To Alleviate the Uncertainty of the Court's
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: The Public Expression of Religion Act, 37 CuMB. L. REV. i, 5
(2oo6) ("[Tlhe remedies [in Establishment Clause challenges] are most often injunctions
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The more difficult task is assessing whether the government contributed
at all or enough to matter. Again, tort law recognizes that for certain toxic
torts, it is impossible to definitely pinpoint whose toxin caused the harm.45
In the face of this uncertainty, the inquiry is usually broken down into two
questions, one focusing on general harm, the other on specific harm.346 The
first question asks whether the defendant's action or product causes the type
of harm that the plaintiff suffered.347 There is no doubt that perpetuating
stereotypes exacerbates discrimination: countless studies have shown how
stereotypes lead to equal protection violations.348 Indeed, our very
understanding of discriminatory decisions includes decisions based on
inaccurate stereotypes.
The second question asks to what degree the defendant's action or
product, if at all, caused this particular plaintiff's harm.349 In tort law, one
among many causes must usually still be a "substantial factor" for liability to
attach.35o Toxic-tort jurisprudence relies on scientific studies and
sophisticated statistics to approximate the degree of responsibility and to
apportion the damages accordingly.35' No such techniques exist in equal
against the offending governmental practice or an overturning of a particular law or
ordinance."); see also, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, (2oo) (involving a plaintiff that
sought an injunction requiring the state to remove a large Latin cross in the Mojave National
Preserve).
345. For example, it is usually not possible to pinpoint whose asbestos caused asbestosis or
increased the plaintiff's risk of contracting the condition. Joseph Sanders, Michael D. Green &
William C. Powers, Jr., The Insubstantiality of the "Substantial Factor" Test for Causation, 73 MO. L.
REV. 399, 415-16 (2oo8). Victims often could not determine with any precision how much any
particular defendant's product contributed to their injury. Id. at 415. Presented with this
irreducible uncertainty, courts found liability when plaintiffs were exposed to defendant's
asbestos product, and that exposure increased the risk of plaintiff developing the disease. Id. at
415-16.
346. Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin
Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1993) ("In mass tort cases, proof of causation comes in two parts:
general causation and specific causation."); see also Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953
S.W.2d 7o6, 714-15 (Tex. 1997) (noting that in toxic-tort cases, plaintiff must show both
general causation and specific causation).
347. Sanders, supra note 346, at 14 ("General causation asks whether exposure to a
substance causes harm to anyone.").
348. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 945, 955-56 (2006); see also Krieger, supra note 318, at 1186-
121 1 (explaining how stereotypes lead to discrimination and citing numerous studies).
349. Sanders, supra note 346, at 14 ("Specific causation asks whether exposure to a
substance caused a particular plaintiffs injury.").
350. See, e.g., Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F. 3 d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[Ilt is enough
that the defendant's fault was a 'substantial factor' in producing the plaintiffs injuries, and the
defendant's fault need not have been the sole proximate cause in order to allow recovery."
(quoting Trudeav v. Wyrick, 713 F.2d 136o, 1367 (8th Cir. 1983))); FDIC v. Bierman, 2 F. 3 d
1424, 1434 (7 th Cir. 1993) (noting that proximate cause "need only be a substantial factor"
leading to the injury, not the sole factor).
351. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928-30 (Cal. 198o) (apportioning
damages in DES mass tort case based on market share).
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protection analyses. Does this mean that the state's unmeasurable
contribution to discrimination should be considered too attenuated to be
attributable to the state?
While the answer is not clear cut, there are several reasons to resist such
a conclusion. First, "substantial cause" is not the only approach when
dealing with multiple indeterminate causes.352 Second, "substantial" has
been interpreted leniently: "The substantial factor standard is a relatively
broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the individual cause be
more than negligible or theoretical."353 According to a standard jury
instruction for these cases, "each of several actors or forces acting
concurrently to cause an injury is a legal cause of the injury 'regardless of
the extent to which each contributes to the injury."'354 Thus, while the state's
contribution might be judged negligible if almost no one saw the anti-atheist
sign, the sign's influence need not be quantified in order to hold the state
accountable. Finally, as mentioned above, precise measurements may be
unnecessary where the plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief. So long as it has
been shown that perpetuating stereotypes exacerbates discrimination-and
it has-the resulting discrimination should be attributed to the state for
injunctive relief. In sum, it is enough that the state is helping to perpetuate
and exacerbate stereotypes that clash with the goals of equal protection. The
state should not be creating conditions that impede nonbelievers from
participating fully in the political and social life of their community and
country,355 especially, as Part IV.D argues, without a persuasive government
interest for doing so.
3. How Government Religious Speech Perpetuates Stereotypes
This brings us back to an earlier question: How exactly does
government religious speech perpetuate negative stereotypes about atheists?
As we saw above, one of the most widespread stereotypes about atheists is
that they are unpatriotic. Logically, the depth of one's religious beliefs
seems unrelated to the depth of one's devotion to the United States. Indeed,
352. In some jurisdictions, once it has been established in toxic-tort suits that the
challenged conduct or product could cause the type of injury that plaintiff suffered, the burden
of proof shifts to defendants to show that their particular conduct or product was not a cause-in-
fact. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 832 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (using
burden-shifting to solve the indeterminate-defendant problem), affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1987); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 170 (Mich. 1984) (explaining that the burden
of proof in DES cases may be shifted to defendants on the element of causation in fact); Collins
v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37,52 (Wis. 1984) (same).
353. Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 9 4 1 P.2d 1203, 1220 (Cal. 1997).
354. Id. (citing standard jury instructions).
355. Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 673, 7o8-o9 (2002) ("To say that the Establishment Clause prohibits this harm is
to say that the Clause aims to stop the state from creating conditions that would impede the
equal ability of religious dissenters to realize their political lives.").
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one could argue that atheists are more likely to be patriotic as they do not
have conflicting obligations.
Nonetheless, the state creates and reaffirms the stereotype by linking
patriotism and God in much of its religious speech. Two of the most
widespread expressions of American patriotism, our national motto ("In
God We Trust") and our national Pledge of Allegiance ("I pledge allegiance
to the flag of the United States of America, and to the republic for which it
stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all"),
invoke God. The motto and the addition of God to the Pledge were both
adopted during the Cold War, when the United States was trying to contrast
its godly citizens with the atheist comrades of the Soviet Union.356 But the
equation works both ways: not only was America superior because its citizens
believed in God while the Soviets did not, but also the Soviet Union was our
enemy in part because the Soviets did not believe in God.357 The bottom line
is that the national Pledge of Allegiance and the national motto embody and
perpetuate the equation that Godly equals patriotic citizen and atheist
equals enemy of the United States, or at the very least, not a loyal citizen.s58
The Latin cross war memorial presents a more difficult example.
Although there is no explicit statement about the morality of nonbelievers,
the government's choice of that one symbol and no other to pay homage
still conveys, if more subtly, messages about morality. According to the
plurality in the recent Salazar v. Buono decision, "a Latin cross is not merely a
reaffirmation of Christian beliefs."359 Rather, "[i] t is a symbol often used to
honor and respect those whose heroic acts, noble contributions, and patient
striving help secure an honored place in history for this Nation and its
people." 6o But this is exactly the kind of nexus the government should not
be promoting. The state should not equate a Christian symbol with moral
traits such as heroism, nobility, striving, and honor. First, the symbol of
American bravery and sacrifice should be an American flag, an American
356. Epstein, supra note 225, at 21 18-23. Before the Cold War, our national motto was "E
pluribus unum," or "Out of many, one." See id. at 2123-24 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 84-1959, at 1
(1956)).
357. In a 1984 public opinion poll, 36% of Americans said that a very important reason
why the Soviet Union is considered our enemy is because its people were atheists. Pub. Agenda
Found., Nuclear Arms and National Security Poll (May 1984), available at iPoll Databank, supra
note 98. Respondents were asked to rank on a scale of one to ten the importance of that
reason, where ten means "a very important reason" and one means "not at all important."
Thirty-six percent chose ten. Id. Another 18% chose between seven and nine. Id. So, over half
the population thought that a country's atheism was a reason why it was our enemy.
358. A number of private billboards make plain this link. A West Virginia billboard reads
"Anti-God is Anti-American." Billboard Wars, DANGEROUS TALK, http://www.dangeroustalk.net/
billboard-wars.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2011). A Pennsylvania billboard, referring to the
attempts to remove "under God" from the Pledge, depicts a little girl pledging allegiance to the
American flag with the tag line "Why Do Atheists Hate America?" Id.




eagle, or some other secular image, not a symbol whose use automatically
excludes a large swath of the U.S. population. Christians may use crosses to
commemorate their dead, but no one else does, and atheists certainly do
not.36,
Second, if the cross is imbued with all these positive qualities, inevitably,
so too is Christianity. Obviously, the cross had positive connotations before it
was used by the government.362 Yet for the government to choose the Latin
cross over the many secular alternatives does send a message. At best, it
suggests that Christianity and Christians are more associated with these
valued traits than everyone else; at worst the message conveyed is that only
Christianity and Christians are associated with these virtues. Either way,
valorizing one religious group and its symbols diminishes the worth of all
those outside that religion. This message is clearly at odds with treating
everyone with equal concern. It also reinforces the longstanding stereotype
that non-Christians, and especially the irreligious, are less heroic, noble, self-
sacrificing, honorable, and indeed, moral, than Christians. Furthermore,
this government message does not appear in a social or historical vacuum. It
is made by a government that has a long history of denigrating the morality
of nonbelievers and in a culture where people equate irreligion with
immorality. In short, a national war memorial in the form of a Latin cross
ought to violate the equal protection component of the Establishment
Clause.363
In sum, government religious speech does not have solely an expressive
dimension but also leads to material harms. Government religious speech-
which so often privileges the Judeo-Christian tradition, and always favors
belief over unbelief-clashes with the state's obligation to treat people with
equal respect regardless of their religious belief or unbelief. In doing so, the
state perpetuates the stereotypes that result in discrimination-
discrimination that deprives atheists of equality in politics, employment,
education, and custody decisions, and makes them outcasts in their own
community and country.
IV. THE LIBERTY COMPONENT OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Establishment Clause has a liberty component as well as an equality
component: the Establishment Clause bar on the state favoring religion also
protects the freedom of conscience of religious minorities, including
nonbelievers.36 4 As with the equality component, the debate with the liberty
361. See supra notes 3oo-o8 and accompanying text.
362. Or at least obviously for Christians.
363. Note that the Supreme Court in Salazar v. Buono did not actually address whether a
Latin cross war memorial violated the Establishment Clause. See supra note 300.
364. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985) (stating that freedom of religion requires
"equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian
faith such as Islam orJudaism").
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component is less about the general proposition that the Establishment
Clause protects the freedom of conscience of nonbelievers than about when
government religious speech actually compromises it.
A. HARM TO CONSCIENCE
Compared to the harm to equality, the harm to liberty is perhaps the
more obvious injury of government establishments. If the state establishes
the Church of Athena as the official state church, and requires everyone to
attend its services and no other, this requirement impinges on the religious
freedom of those of a different faith in two complementary ways.365 First, it
forces them to worship in a manner that conflicts with their true beliefs.
Second, it prevents them from worshipping as their religion teaches them.
Thus, for Christians, mandatory and exclusive attendance at the Church of
Athena both forces them to worship a false god, Athena, in contravention of
the commandment that "[y]ou shall have no other gods before me"s66 and
denies them the chance to worship God as their conscience dictates.
There is no question that for atheists, the first harm to conscience is at
stake. The right to religious liberty includes the right to worship and the
right not to worship. 67 For anyone who does not belong to the Church of
Athena, being forced to participate in a religious practice that is not their
own tramples on their religious liberty. Whether it is not their own because
they belong to a minority religion and worship another way, or because they
are atheists and do not worship at all, mandatory prayers to Athena-or to
bring the hypothetical back to the United States, mandatory prayers to
God-infringe on their religious conscience.3
68
Indeed, state establishment of religion may hit with greater force for
atheists than for other religious minorities. An agnostic ambivalent about a
Supreme Being might not mind praying to God. For those whose belief
system does not insist on a single path to God, religious truth,
enlightenment, or spirituality, a prayer to God is not necessarily inconsistent
with their own beliefs and practices. Perhaps for indifferent atheists too, who
365. See, e.g., Michael A. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection
Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 313 (1986)
(explaining that under the Establishment Clause, "government can neither keep persons from
exercising certain religious beliefs nor may it make them exercise any religion").
366. Exodus 20:3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
367. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 319-20 (1963) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("What our Constitution indispensably protects is the freedom of each of us, be he
Jew or Agnostic, Christian or Atheist, Buddhist or Freethinker, to believe or disbelieve, to
worship or not worship, to pray or keep silent, according to his own conscience, uncoerced and
unrestrained by government.").
368. Note for this intrusion on atheist conscience to count as an Establishment Clause
violation, the Establishment Clause can still be understood to protect religious freedom of
conscience rather than freedom of conscience more broadly since the focus is on conscience
with regard to religious beliefs.
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do not believe in God but are disinterested in religion, participating in what
to them is an empty ritual causes no dissonance. For other atheists, however,
and especially those who affirmatively do not believe in God, being forced to
pray to a nonexistent God is a serious incursion on their conscience.s69
Less certain is whether the harm of being denied the right to practice
one's religion affects atheists. Unless atheism counts as a religion, and
debate swirls about whether it does,37o atheists have no affirmative religious
practices.371 Yet there are a couple of reasons why it might make sense for
Establishment Clause purposes to consider atheism a religion and denying
God a religious practice. To the extent that atheists have any tenets that
might manifest in practice, it is that they do not believe in God and to make
clear that they do not believe in God. Again, this may not be the case for all
nonbelievers: some might just be completely unconcerned about religion
one way or another72 Yet for some, their disbelief in God is central, and
proclaiming this view is a crucial component of their belief system. It is the
atheist version of testifying or witnessing. In addition, if atheism were not a
religion for Establishment Clause purposes, then the state could establish
atheism as its official stance on religion.373 Even if atheism is not a religion,
government establishments still impede atheists' religious practice as long as
"religious practice" is understood to encompass both religious rituals (like
praying) and practices regarding religion (like denying the existence of
God). If so, then state actions that prevent atheists from denying God clearly
compromise atheists' ability to fulfill their religious practices.
In short, a state establishment that prevents atheists from proclaiming
their beliefs infringes their religious freedom of conscience. Likewise, a state
establishment that forces atheists to participate in religious worship infringes
upon their religious freedom of conscience, just as it infringes upon the
369. An online poll of 8200 atheists found that 79% were made at least uncomfortable by
religion invoked in intimate social situations, such as prayers said at family meals, and 82% were
made at least uncomfortable by religion invoked at public gatherings, such as when a speaker
refers to God or says a prayer. Arcaro, supra note 128, at 54-55.
370. See generally Derek H. Davis, Editorial, Is Atheism a Religion? Recent Judicial Perspectives on
the Constitutional Meaning of "Religion, "47 J. CHURCH & ST. 707, 7o8 (2005).
371. Atheists do not pray, attend services, read from a holy book, take sacraments, or
otherwise participate in religious rituals.
372. Secular humanists, for example, may be more focused on "express[ing] [their]
commitment to improv[ingl human welfare in this world." Wat Are Secular Humanist Values?,
COUNCIL FOR SECULAR HUMANIsM, http://www.secularhumanism.org/index.php?section=
main&page=values (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
373. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Diverse Perspectives and the Religion Clauses: An Examination of
Justifications and Qualifying Beliefs, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1433, 1459-61 (1999) (observing
that the state can establish atheism if it is not considered a religion); Douglas Laycock, Formal,
Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1002 (1990)
("Th [el constitutional conception of religious belief as any belief about religion explains why
atheists are protected from persecution, and why the government cannot establish atheism."
(footnote omitted)).
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religious conscience of all those who belong to other religions that do not
subscribe to the mandated practices. This claim is rarely disputed. What is
disputed is whether the state actions that are challenged under the
Establishment Clause in fact coerce in this way.
B. HARM FROM COERCIVE GOVERNMENT RELIGIOUS SPEECH
A major rebuttal to the claim that state religious speech violates the
religious liberty of atheists is that when the state speaks, it does not act
coercively. In the Church of Athena hypothetical, the state required
attendance at the official state religious service and banned attendance at all
others. However, in twenty-first-century America, the state will generally
neither mandate nor forbid attendance at any religious services.374 No one is
required by law to participate in prayers before legislative sessions or to
recite the Pledge of Allegiance75 In fact, statutes implementing recitation
of the Pledge in school must include an opt-out provision for students who
do not wish to join in.376
The persuasiveness of this critique turns on the type of coercion the
Establishment Clause is deemed to prohibit77 No one will quibble that the
state cannot force participation in a state-sponsored religious exercise by
penalty of fine or imprisonment.7 8 But that is not the only way the state can
wield its power. Current Establishment Clause jurisprudence recognizes that
social pressure can be a potent force as well. At least in the public-school
context, courts have recognized that peer pressure in school and additional
social pressure during school events may exert as much coercive influence
on students as the threat of direct state punishment.379 For this reason,
374. But cf, e.g., Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F. 3 d 705, 713 (9 th Cir. 2007) (noting that a parole
officer had recommended revoking parole because he refused to participate in Alcoholics
Anonymous-a program rooted in religious faith).
375. But cf., e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Miss. Judge Sends Lawyer to Jail for Refusing To Recite the
Pledge, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 7, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/miss._judge-sends_
lawyer-tojail-forrefusing-to-recite-thepledge/ (noting that after the attorney silently stood
during the Pledge but refused to recite the words, the judge held him in contempt of court and
sent him to jail). The judge was later reprimanded for misusing the powers of contempt. Miss.
Comm'n onjudicial Performance v. Littlejohn, 2010-JP-019 5 4 -SCT ( 4-1o, 20) (Miss. 2010).
376. The opt-out provision became constitutionally required after Jehovah's Witnesses
successfully claimed that mandatory recitation of the Pledge in school violated their freedom of
conscience. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). At the time of the
challenge, "under God" had not yet been added.
377. Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (defining coercion more broadly
to include peer pressure), with id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I see no warrant for
expanding the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty .. ").
378. See, e.g., id. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing that the Establishment Clause bars
coercion by threat of penalty).
379. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000) ("[T]he delivery of a
pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of
religious worship."); Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 ("[A] high school graduation ceremony places public
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arguments that school recitation of the Pledge is constitutional usually
depend on claims about the secular nature of the Pledge rather than the
lack of coercionso However, the Supreme Court has not recognized that
peer and social pressure may change a nominally voluntary religious
exercise into coerced participation for adults as well, presumably on the
theory that adults' greater maturity allows them to better withstand that type
of pressure.38'
While adults may have greater psychological wherewithal to withstand
peer pressure, some social science calls into question that proposition. For
example, studies like the famous Asch conformity experiments suggest that
adults too may be highly susceptibles8 However, even if it were true that
adults were impervious, adults face other pressures that children do not.
Atheist children may fear losing the good opinion of their teachers or
friends3Ss Atheist adults, on the other hand, may worry about sacrificing
their ability to raise their children, earn a living or participate in civic affairs:
atheist parents may be scared of losing a custody battle for their children;384
atheist employees may be afraid of losing their jobs, while atheist business
owners may worry about losing customers;85 and atheist politicians may
worry about election, re-election, or, as we saw above, recalls 8 6 To argue
pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students .... This pressure, though subtle and
indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.").
38o. E.g., Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F-3 d 1007 (9 th Cir. 2010) (holding
that the Pledge was a patriotic rather than religious exercise).
381. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (noting that as an adult, Marsh was
"presumably not readily susceptible to 'religious indoctrination' or peer pressure" (citations
omitted)); cf Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 291 n.69 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("It is also apparent that . .. social influence within the school
environment varies inversely with the age, grade level, and consequent degree of sophistication
of the child.").
382. In Asch's classic experiment on conformity, subjects were shown three lines and asked
which best matched a fourth line. When asked with no one present, 99% answered correctly.
When asked after several people gave the wrong answer, 70% of the subjects went along with
the group at least once and also gave the wrong answer. SOLOMON E. ASCH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
450-59 (1952); see Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity, 70 PSYCHOL.
MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED 1, 1, 9-24 (1956); see also LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE
PERSON AND THE SITUATION 33 (1991) ("[S]tudies [have] demonstrated again and again that
arbitrarily constructed groups, even ones that hold no long-term power to reward conformity or
punish dissent, can exert potent conformity pressures.").
383. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling Twp., 714 F. Supp. 932, 937
(N.D. 11. 1989) (finding that a first-grader with freethinking background may have felt
compelled to recite the Pledge because of "fears of embarrassment [and] potential loss of...
friends" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
384. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text (discussing how courts use religion as a
factor in deciding custody disputes).
385. See supra Part II.A-B (discussing discrimination against atheists).
386. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (discussing public opinion polls
regarding unwillingness to vote for an atheist); supra Part IIB.i (discussing recall of a Town
Trustee who could not in good conscience recite the Pledge with "under God"); see also Marsh,
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politicians feel no pressure to conform when faced with the choice between
following their conscience or exposing themselves as an atheist is to deny
the reality of being atheist in America.38 7 Nor does it suffice to respond that
politicians should be accountable to the electorate. Of course, politicians
should be accountable to the people who vote for them, and should lose
their seats if they disappoint their constituents-but surely not for irrelevant
personal characteristics. While morality may be a relevant characteristic, lack
of belief in God is not correlated with it.388 In sum, given that the loss of
children, work, or political power may do more damage to someone's life
than a fine, it is unconvincing to argue that a state custom of praying or
pledging to God exerts no coercive pressure on adult atheists to violate their
conscience.
C. HARM FROM PASSIVE GovERNMENTDIsPLAYS
Still, even with a broad definition of coercion, it is not immediately
obvious how what have been termed "passive displays" of religiosity violate
anyone's freedom of conscience.38 9 A state-erected cross seems to force no
one, even indirectly, through the threat of social ostracism or the risk of
personal, financial, or political ruin, to participate in any kind of religious
exercise for the simple reason that there is no religious exercise. Granted, it
is somewhat odd to describe a display as "passive," as not many displays are
"active." Compared to religious exercises, however, these religious displays
are "passive." Consequently, displays like the Latin cross or a cr&he, or
government statements like "In God We Trust" on our money, raise the
question as to whether they even trigger the liberty component of the
Establishment Clause.
One response is that even these "passive displays" exert some coercive
influence on viewers. The Supreme Court suggested as much when, after
stating that coercion is not a necessary element for an Establishment Clause
violation,39o it went on to observe, "When the power, prestige and financial
463 U.s. at 8o8 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Legislative prayer .... intrudes on the right to
conscience by forcing some legislators either to participate in a 'prayer opportunity' with which
they are in basic disagreement, or to make their disagreement a matter of public comment by
declining to participate." (internal citation omitted)).
387. Or at least, it is to deny the reality of being atheist in most parts of America. There may
be a few regions where admitting a lack of belief in God is not political suicide. Likewise,
perhaps in certain fields atheism may not equate with career or business suicide.
388. See supra notes 122-26 (discussing social science regarding the morality of
nonbelievers).
389. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573,662 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he risk of
infringement of religious liberty by passive or symbolic accommodation is minimal."); Douglas
Laycock, Religious Liberty in America, HUM. RTS., Summer 2oo6, at 3, 6 ("[lI]t is hard to find
coercion in a passive display.").
39o . Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
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support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the
prevailing officially approved religion is plain."39, Whether this is empirically
true has not been definitively proven. One might argue that this assumption
gives too much credit to the government's ability to influence. On the other
hand, studies of government advertising campaigns suggest that government
speech can influence behavior.392 Plus, it is hardly unreasonable to believe
that government religious speech, if only by virtue of its sheer ubiquity,393
will exert some kind of influence on people's thinking about religion.
Notably, this influence can take place at different stages of people's
religious development. So far, this Article has focused on how government
religious speech might affect those who have already arrived at their
atheism. However, government religious speech also operates on those
whose religious convictions might be unformed or in flux.394 This fact raises
the issue of whether the government should be putting its imprimatur on
certain beliefs as opposed to others. A state whose activities and mottos are
religiously inflected may influence people into one channel of belief rather
than another. Under the Establishment Clause, however, the government
should refrain from influencing people's religious development.395 In this
case, the government religious speech might more accurately be described
391. Id. at 4 31.
392. See, e.g., PUBLIC COMMUNICATION CAMPAIGNS 277 (RONALD E. RICE & CHARLES K. Atkin
eds., 3 d ed. 2001) (arguing that there is suggestive evidence that the Smoky the Bear campaign
has reduced forest fires); D. Hammond et al., Effectiveness of Cigarette Warning Labels in Informing
Smokers About the Risk of Smoking: Findings from the International Tobacco Control (ITC) Four Country
Survey, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL iiil9 , iii9 (2oo6) (noting that recent research "indicates that
graphic warning labels on cigarette packages can increase cessation beiaviour among
smokers"); Jennifer K. Ibrahim & Stanton A. Glantz, The Rise and Fall of Tobacco Control Media
Campaigns, 1967-2oo6, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1383, 1394 (2007) ("[T]here is strong
empirical evidence that ... media campaigns can substantially contribute to a reduction in
smoking rates.").
393. For example, "In God We Trust" appears on the U.S. currency, and the Pledge is
recited daily in most public schools.
394. The Supreme Court's greater concern about proselytizing to schoolchildren is
presumably based on the idea that children's religious beliefs may be less defined and that
children are more vulnerable to proselytizing. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-86
(1971) (noting that college students were "less impressionable and less susceptible to religious
indoctrination" than those in primary or secondary school).
395. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based
Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 26 (1997) (noting that an "integrating principle" of the
religion clauses is to "neutraliz[e] the impact of governmental action on personal religious
choices"); Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43,
43-44 (1997) (arguing that an underlying purpose of religious liberty is to minimize
government influence on religious choices).
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as influential rather than coercive, but under the Establishment Clause it
ought not rise to even that level.39
6
There is yet another way that so-called passive displays and speech
negatively impact the freedom of conscience of nonbelievers. By reinforcing
the negative stereotypes about atheists,397 government religious speech helps
create a climate in which atheists do not feel comfortable following the
dictates of their conscience. As a result, they choose to stay in the closet and
pass as believers. The personal costs of pretending to be something you are
not should not be underestimated. Kenji Yoshino has detailed some of the
harms of passing, which include isolation,39s8 exhaustion,99 and the fact that
"the individual who passes always simultaneously takes on the identity of a
liar."4oo Atheists report feeling dishonest about hiding their beliefs and the
hope of living authentically is a major impetus for disclosing their
atheism.4o-
Government religious speech that reinforces stereotypes that atheists
are immoral and unpatriotic contributes to the public's negative, if not
hostile, views about atheists. It is this distrust and hostility that makes atheists
think twice about disclosing their beliefs. One need only listen to the
participants at the first African Americans for Humanism Conference or
read the Dear Richard letters seeking advice about "coming out as an
atheist" to realize how the atmosphere in this country makes it exceeding
difficult for nonbelievers to live an honest true-to-their-conscience life.
While violence may be rare, it is not unheard of.40 At the very least, who
396. See supra note 395 (citing scholars that view the Establishment Clause as barring the
State from influencing people's religious beliefs).
397. See supra Part III.B.3 (describing how government religious speech reinforces
stereotypes of atheists as immoral and unpatriotic).
398. Hiding one's true self means sacrificing potential support from those who share the
same stigmatized trait. Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility
Presumption and the Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 1O8 YALE LJ. 485, 527-28 (1998).
399. Id. at 528 (summarizing studies of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals that describe how
passing requires "constantly decid[ing] whether to tell, whom to tell, and when to tell," and
"constantly monitor[ing] emotional responses in order not to reveal ... true feelings"
(alteration in original) (quotingJoanne DiPlacido, Minority Stress Among Lesbians, Gay Men, and
Bisexuals, in STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION, 138, 148-49 (Gregory M. Harek ed., 1998))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
400. Id.
401. Alidoosti, supra note 25, at 44 (explaining that one of the main reasons study
participants disclosed their atheism to family members was because they wished to be "truthful
about who they were, both for their own peace of mind, as well as being sincere with those they
loved and cared about the most").
402. As one atheist remarked, "One of the things that rules your life when you're an atheist
is fear. You never know when you're going to be attacked." Richard Cimino & Christopher
Smith, Secular Humanism and Atheism Beyond Progressive Secularism, 68 SOC. RELIGION 407, 421
(2007) (quoting Paul, a "fifty-six-year-old businessman in Washington, D.C [sic] area during the
Godless March on Washington") (internal quotation marks omitted); see supra notes 151-52
and accompanying text (describing violence against atheists).
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wants to publicly reveal themselves as a member of a disliked, distrusted
minority and open themselves up to ostracism and discrimination? It is not
surprising, then, that so many people choose to stay in the closet, despite the
high costs to their conscience.
D. BALANCING GOVERNMENT INTERESTS AND HARMS TO NONBELIEVERS
As discussed, discrimination is one of the harms of government
religious speech under the equality component of the Establishment Clause.
Under its liberty component, however, discrimination is not the ultimate
harm, but rather a cause of the harm of staying in the closet-raising the
question of whether the link between government religious speech and this
harm to conscience is too attenuated to amount to a violation of the
Establishment Clause.403 Nevertheless, if the state interest in government
religious speech is weak, especially compared to Establishment Clause
interests in government not speaking in this way, then perhaps the
Establishment Clause should reach this state speech. So what is the
government interest at stake in government religious speech? In Free
Exercise Clause cases, there is often a genuine clash between the
government's regulatory interest in the health and safety of the nation and
the individual's interest in his or her religious practice. Consequently, Free
Exercise cases have addressed whether child-welfare laws should trump the
religious command to proselytize4o4 and whether drug laws should trump a
religious sacrament involving peyote.40 5 It is less clear, however, what state
interest is advanced by government religious speech when having a war
memorial in the form of a cross or a national motto that invokes God does
not safeguard either health or safety.
Both secular and religious justifications have been offered for
government religious speech. The secular reasons are many. For example,
our national motto is meant to unify us as a people,4o6 while our pledge is
meant to unify us and inculcate love of country.40 7 The Latin cross war
403. In fact, claims involving government religious speech that might rely on these
arguments have been rejected for lack of standing. But it is not so much that there is no harm,
for clearly feeling pressure to act against one's conscience is a harm. Rather, the question is
whether the harm ought to be attributed to the state given the intervening factors.
404. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that a Jehovah's Witness child
may not sell religious magazines in contravention of state child labor laws).
405. Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (199
o
) (holding that
the Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from neutral and generally applicable
drug laws).
406. ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3 d 289, 307 (6th Cir.
2001 ) (noting that "the national motto, and the national anthem, and the pledge of allegiance
... [are] symbol[s] of a common identity" and that "[s]uch symbols unquestionably serve an
important secular purpose-reenforcing the citizen's sense of membership in an identifiable
state or nation").
407. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 6 (2004).
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memorial is meant to commemorate and honor the sacrifice of World War I
veterans.4o8 All of these are legitimate and important goals.
Yet these ends can be achieved by wholly secular means. Indeed, a
purely secular approach would more successfully accomplish these goals. A
national motto that did not exclude millions on its face-such as our pre-
Cold War motto "E pluribus unum," translated "Out of Many, One"-is
likely to be more unifying than one that does.4o9 Restoring the Pledge to its
pre-Cold War formulation (i.e., without "under God") would not only be
more unifying for the same reason but would more successfully epitomize
"liberty and justice for all."4'o Similarly, erecting a more inclusive symbol
would better show respect for all war veterans, Christian believers, non-
Christian believers, and nonbelievers alike, who gave up their lives for the
American ideals of liberty and equality for everyone. One of the nation's
most moving and visited memorials is the Vietnam War Memorial-a black
granite wall engraved with the names of over 58,000 Americans killed in that
war.4, Given this, the secular justifications for government religious speech
are weak at best.
Courts and commentators have also suggested a religious reason for
government religious speech. Such speech is necessary, the argument goes,
because the lack of government religious speech shows hostility toward
religion,41 which is directly counter to the goals of the religion clauses.4'3 A
typical argument is that, while atheists and other religious minorities might
408. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (201o). Along these lines, criches are meant
to celebrate the holiday season, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984), and the Ten
Commandments are meant to recognize our history, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686-88
(2005).
409. See Epstein, supra note 226, at 2122-24 (discussing the motto change from "E pluribus
unum" to "In God We Trust").
410. See id. at 2118-22 (discussing the addition of "under God" to the Pledge of
Allegiance).
411. FAQS, VIET. VETERANS MEMORIAL FUND, http://www.vvmf.org/141.cfm (last visited
Nov. 1, 2011 ). The World War II Memorial in Washington, D.C. is comprised of 56 columns in
two half circles with arches at either end. World War 11 Memorial, NPS.GOV, http://
www.nps.gov/nwwm/historyculture/index.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 201 1). The Korean War
Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C. consists of nineteen stainless steel statues representing
ground troops on patrol. Korean War Veterans Memorial, NPS.Gov, http://www.nps.gov/kowa/
index.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2011). Countless other memorials have used flames, fountains,
flags, eagles, architectural elements, or other nonreligious elements.
412. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 657
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
barring all government religious speech "would border on latent hostility toward religion");
Wallace, supra note 253, at 1200 (arguing that requiring government silence regarding
religious matters "would marginalize or trivialize religious views by making them seem
irrelevant, outdated, or even strange").
413. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 5 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 115,
120 (1992) (describing that the court interpreted the religion clauses to protect individual
religious life and to foster a regime of religious pluralism).
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be offended by state acknowledgement of God, those belonging to the
religious mainstream can be offended by the State's eradication of religion
from the public square.414
The first response is that interpreting the Establishment Clause to bar
government religious speech does not eliminate religion from the public
square. To start, the Establishment Clause does not require the government
to be completely silent on the topic of religion.4,5 For example, as long as
religion is taught as part of a secular curriculum, public schools may teach
about religious traditions in a comparative religion class, study the language
of the Bible in literature class, and discuss the importance of religious
movements in a social studies class.4, 6 In addition, the Establishment Clause
does not constrain private religious speech.4'7 On the contrary, Free Speech
Clause protection for private religious speech has been ratcheted up ever
since the Supreme Court interpreted restrictions on religious speech as a
viewpoint rather than a subject-matter limit.4,8 As a result, any attempt to
regulate private religious speech in any forum-traditional, designated,
limited, or nonpublic-will be subject to strict scrutiny.4'9 Consequently, the
First Amendment encourages robust private religious speech in the public
square, and there is no danger of it vanishing.
414. Choper, supra note 254, at 529 ("[F]inding an Establishment Clause violation on
feelings of alienation or offense alone usually makes a decision to protect the distressed
sensibilities of the religious minority (or nonbelievers) and to ignore those of the religious
majority ... ."); Richard M. Esenberg, Must God Be Dead or Irrelevant: Drawing a Circle That Lets
Me In, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J. 1, 8 (2009) (stating that the government's attempt to remain
religiously neutral in its public speech results in a "public secularity that makes religious
dissenters just as uncomfortable as public religiosity would make nonadherents.").
415. A recent study has shown that many Americans misunderstand exactly what is
forbidden by the Establishment Clause. Just over a third (36%) understood that comparative
religion classes may be taught in public school, while even fewer (23%) understood that public
school teachers could read from the Bible as an example of literature. PEW FORUM ON RELIGION
& PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE SURVEY 9 (2OO), available at http://pewforum.org/
uploadedFiles/Topics/Belief andPractices/religious-knowledge-full-report.pdf.
416. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) ("Nothing we have
said here indicates that [thel study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as
part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First
Amendment.").
417. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) ("[T]here is a crucial
difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect." (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
418. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector &Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb's
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 5o8 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981).
419. Under forum-analysis doctrine, viewpoint restrictions are always subject to strict
scrutiny. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009). Subject-matter
limits, however, need only be rational in nonpublic forums. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 46o U.S. 37, 54 (1983).
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The second response is that this critique misunderstands the nature of
the harms. The harm to atheists and other religious minorities is not
offense, but loss of equality and liberty. These are real harms that cannot be
summarily dismissed. Since these are significant concerns under the
Establishment Clause, it is only fair to query whether eliminating
government religious speech intrudes on the equality or liberty of religious
believers.
As a preliminary matter, the answer may depend on whether the focus is
on believers within the Judeo-Christian, or really Christian, tradition or
believers outside of it. Removing God from the Pledge of Allegiance or
removing Ten Commandment monuments from state grounds is probably
not an issue for Buddhists and Wiccan believers in the way it may be for
Christian believers.4o Accordingly, the complaint about hostility toward
religion is really about hostility toward Christianity.
As discussed above, government religious speech undermines the
equality of nonbelievers by failing to show them equal regard and by
facilitating discrimination against them. Does the absence of government
religious speech work the same kind of equality harms to Christians? As far
as perpetuating stereotypes go, the answer is no. Studies do not show that
Christians are stereotyped as less patriotic or moral or less able, motivated,
or reliable; on the contrary, assumptions made about believers are generally
positive.42, Furthermore, the absence of speech does not perpetuate any
stereotypes about them. In short, that particular harm to equality is not
present for Christians.
Perhaps then, the failure to speak religiously, especially in the face of
opposition to that silence, fails to show equal regard in the same way as
mounting a religious display in the face of opposition fails to show equal
regard for nonbelievers. Or maybe it is the removal of existing religious
speech or symbols that shows hostility toward religion: whatever might be
said about a decision not to erect a new Ten Commandments monument,
dismantling a long-established one requires the government to actively
eliminate religion. For many Americans, such concrete actions against
religion amount to affirmative hostility.422 Some have argued that with
regard to government religious speech, the government is in a no-win
position: if the state speaks religiously, it will be seen as favoring believers,
420. I do not mean to imply that all Christians feel the same way about government
religious speech. Rather, it is mostly Christians, not members of minority religions, who
complain about how eliminating government religious speech would demonstrate government
hostility toward religion.
421. See supra note i 19 and accompanying text.
422. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 13o S. Ct. 18o 3 , 1823 (2010) (AlitoJ., concurring) ("The
demolition of this venerable if unsophisticated, [Latin cross war] monument would also have
been interpreted by some as an arresting symbol of a Government that is not neutral but hostile
on matters of religion and is bent on eliminating from all public places and symbols any trace of
our country's religious heritage.").
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and if it fails to speak religiously, it will be seen as favoring nonbelievers, if
not establishing atheism.423
Notably, for the argument that government silence on religion reflects
hostility toward religion to have any traction, one would have to accept an
expressivist approach, as there are no material consequences to believers
from removing "under God" from the Pledge or replacing the Latin cross
with a bald eagle as a war memorial. Accepting this, the answer is once
again, no.
To start, government religious speech and government silence on
religion are not equivalent. Adopting the symbols and language of one faith
comes much closer to endorsement than silence comes to endorsing lack of
faith. Endorsement of atheism would be changing the Pledge of Allegiance
from "one nation under God" to "one nation without God." The affirmative
denial of God evinces hostility toward religion (or at least religions that
center on God). Silence does not. Indeed, for decades the Pledge did not
mention God. Few would argue, however, that the Pledge was hostile to
religion before its amendment. Silence is simply far more ambiguous than
affirmative statements. As the Supreme Court has noted: "A secular state, it
must be remembered, is not the same as an atheistic or antireligious state. A
secular state establishes neither atheism nor religion as its official creed."424
The antireligion argument also assumes a baseline of no rules about
religion. However, that is not the baseline in the United States. In this
country, the constitutionally mandated baseline is no establishment. And it
is no establishment in order to encourage all religions, many of which do
not center on God. In other words, failure to mention God one way or
another is how the state displays an equal regard for all belief systems.42 5 The
motivation is not animosity toward belief or preference for nonbelief; rather
423. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and
the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 310-11 (1987) (stating that if the state speaks
religiously, "persons who do not adhere to the predominant religion may feel like 'outsiders,'
and if it does not, "some religious people will feel that their most central values and concerns
... have been excluded from a public culture devoted purely to secular concerns"). An
alternative approach might be to speak favorably of both; for example, perhaps the Pledge of
Allegiance could include "without God" and the national motto could include "God," but that
seems like a much less effective way of withholding judgment or favor than simply not
endorsing any belief system. Besides the oddness, it still reflects a worldview that assumes only
two positions on religion: belief in God, or disbelief in God. It ignores all the believers whose
faith does not center on God.
424. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 61o (1989).
425. RexJ. Ahdar, A Christian State?, 13J.L. & REUiGION 453, 458 (1999) (observingJames
Wood's view that "the concept of a secular state was not born out of a hostility toward religion
(for the secular state is neither hostile nor friendly but is simply uncommitted in matters
religious) but rather out of a respect for freedom of conscience and a recognition of the
incompetence of the state in purely spiritual matters").
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it is an attempt to treat all religious belief systems equally.426 Indeed, driving
the Establishment Clause's prohibitions is the idea that they provide the best
way for all religions to flourish, including the dominant one.42 7 Nor is there
a more effective alternative. Thus, the claim that government's removal of
God or a cross is hostile to religion conflates Christianity with religion and
ignores the existence of all other believers.42s
Finally, while removing the symbols of Christianity may work a change
in Christians' status,42 9 it is not a change from equal citizen to second-class
citizen. Rather, it is a change from privileged citizen to equal citizen. Today,
Christians and Christianity are favored and endorsed by the state.430
426. Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 612-13 ("[T]he Court's decision today, [requiring
removal of a nativity scene], does not represent a hostility or indifference to religion but,
instead, the respect for religious diversity that the Constitution requires.").
427. The Establishment Clause prohibitions are, after all, also meant to protect the favored
religion from corruption and degradation. Some Christians, for example, believe that allowing
government to speak religiously actually undermines Christianity. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady,
Fostering Harmony Among the Justices: How Contemporary Debates in Theology Can Help To Reconcile the
Divisions on the Court Regarding Religious Expression by the State, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 433, 553
(1999) ("[R]eligious expression by the government may distort and demean the sacred
meaning that religious language and symbols carry for many individuals."); see also Thomas C.
Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 41, 71 (2003)
("[S]ilence about God is ... the way in which the state in America acknowledges its limits. If the
state makes any explicit religious affirmation, it ends up defining and limiting the transcendent
reality rather than deferring to it. Therefore, the only way for the state to acknowledge its limits
is by remaining silent. ... ").
428. Those whose faith permeates their life, so that its absence in any facet is contrary to
their religious worldview, might protest that removing government religious speech is hostile to
their religious beliefs. For those whose belief system requires government religious speech, its
cessation conflicts with their beliefs. However, that is not the same thing as concluding that the
social meaning of ending government religious belief is hostility toward religion. Just as the
social meaning of government practices that happen to coincide with religious beliefs such as
laws against murder (thou shall not kill) or perjury (thou shall not bear false witness) is not
endorsement of religion, the social meaning of government practices that happen to clash with
particular religious beliefs is not hostility toward religion. This is especially true when the
practice is motivated by an attempt to show equal respect for all beliefs, and there is no better
way to achieve that goal. The impossibility of guaranteeing equal treatment of all religions given
the case of the religion that demands state endorsement is parallel to the impossibility of
tolerating all beliefs in a liberal state, given that some beliefs demand intolerance.
429. There is no denying that some Christians genuinely feel under attack. The substitution
of "happy holidays" for "merry Christmas" by private retailers has been described as evidence of
a "War on Christmas." The American Family Association urges its members to boycott stores
who attempt to be nonsectarian during the holiday season. Natalie Zmuda, In "The War on
Christmas," Christmas is Winning, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/ 4026o88 9 /ns/busines-holiday-retail/t/war-christmas-christmas-winning/#.TlW520
LWTFB (reporting that, according to the American Family Association, the percentage of
retailers whose advertisements include Christmas has increased from 20% to 8o% in the past
five years).
430. See Corbin, supra note 295, at 1578-79 ("Applying Catharine MacKinnon's
observations to Christian privilege, it becomes evident that their Sabbath defines the workweek,
their sacred days define state and national holidays, their morality defines the family and
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Removing these symbols would mean that they, like everyone else, would
receive no special state endorsement of their particular beliefs. Nonetheless,
even assuming that there was a draw with respect to the expressivist analysis,
the overall effect on equality-where one choice would result in
discrimination against nonbelievers while the alternate would have no such
effect on Christian believers-clearly differs.
What about the liberty component: Does cleansing religion from
government speech hurt the liberty of believers? Government religious
speech impedes the liberty of nonbelievers by coercing them into
participating in religious practices or at least influencing them to conform
to mainstream religious beliefs. In addition, the perpetuation of stereotypes
may also make nonbelievers less likely to obey their conscience and openly
acknowledge their nonbelief. Here too, the harms of government religious
speech to nonbelievers' liberty far outweigh any harm to (some) believers
when the government declines to speak religiously. Reciting a pledge
without mentioning God will not violate anyone's religious conscience in the
same way reciting a pledge with "under God" does.431 Nor will the
government's silence about God make those who believe in a Supreme
Being feel uncomfortable about, never mind afraid of, attending church or
praying or otherwise observing their beliefs. They simply are not subjected
to the kind of discrimination and hostility that nonbelievers face.
The main threat to the religious liberty of believers is the possibility that
the government's silence on religion may influence those whose belief
systems are undecided to choose a path without religion.432 While the
government may not endorse religion, however, plenty of private individuals
do, so that in the marketplace of religious ideas, believers far, far outnumber
nonbelievers. In any case, government silence on religion is not comparable
to government religious speech. Government religious speech in the United
States, which invariably draws on the Judeo-Christian tradition, definitely
does take a position on religion. Government silence on religion, on the
other hand, although it may be construed as government endorsement of
nonreligion, is better understood as a government attempt to refrain from
determines when life begins, belief in their God characterizes patriotism, and invocation of
their God solemnizes, dignifies, and authenticates." (footnotes omitted)).
431. In other words, while pledges in general may violate some people's religious beliefs,
see, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), a pledge is not likely to
violate a person's belief because it does not include God. To argue otherwise would mean that
the pledge recited by millions through two world wars violated people's religious beliefs for
lacking any mention of God. Cf Steven G. Gey, "Under God," the Pledge of Allegiance, and Other
Constitutional Trivia, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1865, 1907 (2003).
432. Esenberg, supra note 414, at 39 ("[O]stensibly secular messages ... interfere with
religious formation.").
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favoring some religious beliefs over others.43s In short, asserting that the
harms are the same for believers and nonbelievers whichever choice the
government makes is simply false. Indeed, the fact that religious believers do
not risk the kind of hostility and discrimination that nonbelievers do belies
any claim that they are.
V. CONCLUSION
One of the main goals of the Establishment Clause is to ensure that the
state does not compromise the equality or liberty of anyone based on their
religious beliefs. The Establishment Clause bars the state from favoring
religion not only to prevent the state from treating religious minorities as
less than equal citizens but also to prevent the state from intruding on their
religious freedom of conscience. Yet government religious speech, which
usually takes the form of some kind of affirmation of God, has just such an
effect on nonbelievers. Government religious speech sends a message that
nonbelievers are not worthy of equal regard. It also undermines
nonbelievers' equality by reinforcing stereotypes that lay at the root of so
much discrimination against them. The perpetuation of these stereotypes
also compromises atheists' liberty by making them less willing, even
frightened, to openly follow the dictates of their nonbelieving conscience.
And of course, coercive government speech may compromise religious
liberty by forcing nonbelievers to participate in religious practices that
conflict with their true beliefs. Thus, the claim that government religious
speech does not violate the Establishment Clause because all it does is
offend nonbelievers misunderstands exactly what is at stake.
433. This is especially true since most government religious speech does not favor religion
generally, but some religions over others. Thus, government silence on religion benefits not
only nonbelievers but also believers outside the dominantJudeo-Christian mainstream.
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